RESULTS

1978: Ballot Question 8

            The relationship between the MRA and the tobacco industry spans at least 20 years.  In October 1978, the Massachusetts Restaurant Association and the tobacco industry joined forces to oppose a non-binding ballot initiative that could have restricted smoking in public places to clearly marked enclosed areas.4  The Tobacco Institute estimated that it would cost less than $50,000 to mobilize groups to fight this initiative in communities throughout the state, and they did so by using the MRA to direct this opposition.4  The TI also planned to conduct a public opinion survey for approximately $28,200, and then to launch a direct-mail program during the final week of the campaign, with costs for this program estimated at $71,800.4  The TI, with “concerned citizens of the Massachusetts Hotel and Restaurant industry,” formed “a political committee,” called Independent Citizens for an Effective Government (ICEG), to “fund the opposition to the referendum.”[7]  The chairman of ICEG, and leader of the opposition to what became ballot Question 8, was Stephen Elmont, the president of the Soups On restaurant chain, a non-smoker, and the in-coming president of the MRA.7  Dennis Dyer, the public affairs manager for the TI, was appointed the treasurer of ICEG, and was the only person who was allowed to write checks for the committee.  The TI retained Ringe/Russo Associates, Inc. to assist with implementation of their plan, as well as hired Choate, Hall, and Stewart to keep the ICEG’s books and to advise them on state reporting rules, which were “very complex.”7

During the campaign to pass Question 8, the Secretary of State deleted the words “in enclosed spaces” from the ballot before printing.7  As a result, it became unclear whether or not outdoor smoking in public venues would also be prohibited by the initiative.7  The intention of the sponsors of the initiative was to ban or restrict smoking indoors, but when they requested either a recall of the ballots or that a correction notice be sent out to inform the public of the printing error, the Attorney General refused.7  According to the TI, “the committee and Ringe/Russo have noted these matters and our direct mail copy and telephone script will be designed accordingly.”7  The collaboration between the tobacco industry and the MRA to oppose ballot Question 8, with a little help from the Massachusetts Secretary of State and the state’s Attorney General, certainly contributed to the defeat of an initiative that would have required district representatives to vote for legislation to ban or restrict indoor smoking in public places.

1984: Restaurant Restrictions in Boston

            In March 1984, the State Activities Division of the TI reported on a number of smoking restriction laws that were proposed in the Massachusetts legislature, as well as those that were being considered by local governments and boards of health across the state.[8]  For example, at the state level, Senate bill S.1382, which called for the self-extinguishing of smoking materials in public places, was “killed in the Senate … on recommendation of [the] Joint Public Safety [Committee].”8 

It was also reported that there was “good news in Boston,” where the City Council “accepted the Government Operations Committee’s unanimous ‘ought not to pass’ recommendation on [a] restaurant [smoking] restriction measure.”8  According to the TI, “solid coalition building sunk [the] Boston restaurant restriction ordinance … [the] Government Operations Committee hearing [was] attended by [the] Chamber of Commerce, [the] Massachusetts Restaurant Association, [the] Greater Boston Restaurant Association, [the] Massachusetts Hotel/Motel Association, two-thirds of major Boston hotels as well as 30 of the City’s major restaurants.”8  The defeat of the proposed restaurant smoking restrictions was aided by the testimony of the “President of Boston’s oldest restaurant” who “experimented with voluntary ‘no smoking’ sections” and whose “two month test yielded only two ‘no smoking’ requests from 17,000 customers.” 8

1985: Clean Indoor Air Acts

            The Massachusetts legislature began to consider major clean indoor air legislation in the 1970s, and in 1975 it passed a law to regulate smoking in public elevators, supermarkets, museums, libraries, hospitals, nursing homes, trains, airplanes, single-car public transportation, and on transportation provided by the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority.[9]  By February 1985, no further restrictions had been passed at the state level, but a $0.05 tobacco tax increase was enacted in 1982.9  Proposed legislation to regulate indoor air was passed out of the Joint Health Care Committee in 1985 with an “ought to pass” recommendation, but “because of their fiscal impact, [the proposed bills were] sent to House Ways and Means, where they failed to receive consideration … this has prompted anti-tobacco activists to decry the supposed ability of the industry to tie legislation up in committee.”9

However, analysis of tobacco industry documents reveals that this supposition by “anti-tobacco activists” was accurate.  In a 1985 Tobacco Action Network (TAN) memo, the author stated that “historically, the industry has been successful by keeping tobacco issues off the floor.  Legislative leadership changes effected in 1985 may limit our ability to keep legislation off the floor.  A floor vote in either house would be, at best, a very narrow and difficult win for the industry.”9  In order to help fight clean indoor air laws in the state legislature, TAN created an elaborate plan of action that included direct lobbying, fostering legislative support, and creating alliances with businesses in Boston and throughout the state.9 

The Massachusetts Restaurant Association figured prominently in the tobacco industry’s plan, as did hospitality associations, chambers of commerce, and organized labor.  According to TAN, “ the education of their members and direct lobbying of legislators is the aid we seek from these groups,” as well as contacting of subsidiaries, suppliers, and advertisers within Massachusetts to secure their early opposition to this legislation.9  As an added boon, support in the form of materials or services would be almost impossible for the state to track because many of “the actions requested herein do not require the participants to register as legislative agents [or] lobbyists.”9  Since some forms of collaboration between the MRA and the tobacco industry fell outside of the purview of the state’s mandatory reporting requirements, this provided the industry with an extra incentive to use these strategies to influence state and local policymaking in Massachusetts.

1986-1989: Opposing Smoking Restrictions

The MRA and the tobacco industry continued their joint opposition to state and local clean indoor air legislation, as well as to workplace and restaurant smoking restrictions, through the end of this decade.[10]^,[11],[12]   One state-level smoking restriction bill that was in its third reading in the Senate in October 1987 was the target of pro-tobacco intervention, when the “TI staff and legislative counsel continue[d] to work closely with the MRA to defeat this bill.”11  The bill would have required nonsmoking sections in restaurants, but it would not have mandated the size of those sections.

Similar sentiments were echoed in a Tobacco Institute report issued in September 1989, which discussed a TI pilot program to reduce stringent smoking restrictions in three localities in Eastern Massachusetts – Somerville, Malden, and Braintree – to the level of the state’s statute requirements.12  If the TI was successful in these efforts, they planned to attempt to enact comparable restaurant restriction “rollbacks” in additional cities.12  Even though the TI admitted that “in reality, most of these laws have been in place for a number of years” with “little impact [on restaurant businesses] and no legal ramifications,” they were still determined to reverse these laws.12  Likewise, even though the MRA knew that restaurants in these three cities experienced “little impact,” the Association still led this rollback effort, with the support of local restaurant owners and managers.12  However, “the function of the Institute” was “limited to resources and organizational activities” because “direct tobacco contact with this effort would have a negative impact on its ultimate outcome.”12  The leadership role assumed by the MRA helped to minimize the visibility of tobacco industry involvement in state and local tobacco control policymaking.   The close political association of the MRA and Big Tobacco appears to have been mutually beneficial.  Tobacco companies did not suffer the loss of profits that might accompany smoking bans or restrictions, while the MRA membership base increased over time, as did its income from dues, perhaps in part because restaurant and bar owners wanted to protect themselves from the perceived threat of smoking bans.[13]

1990-1992: Economic Downturn

            Although the Massachusetts economy was booming in the early and mid-1980s, an economic downturn began in 1988, and this reversal of the “Massachusetts Miracle” left the state with little option but to raise taxes.  This reality was well-known to the tobacco industry, and was anticipated in a 1990 memo by the TI, which foresaw an increase in tobacco taxes as inevitable for two reasons: first, because the industry had successfully defeated “proposed increases during the past eight years while all other taxes increased;” and second, because a Democratic legislature would be “looking for minimal cost legislation that looks progressive” which could “prove to be a problem for the tobacco industry.”[14]

To counter these anticipated problems, the Tobacco Institute created a detailed plan of action in 1990, ranging from the coordination of efforts with the legislature and administration, to the cultivation of alliances with organized labor, businesses associations, chambers of commerce, and other potentially interested parties in the state of Massachusetts.  The TI’s plan of action contained a number of “Pro-Active Proposals” with section headings such as “State Tax Plan,” “Hiring Discrimination,” “Indoor Air Quality,” “Minors,” and “Restaurant Restriction Rollback.”  Each proposal listed the coalition allies that needed to be developed or called upon, as well as the specific tobacco industry resources that had to be accessed or minimized in order to successfully implement the proposals.14 

As “the primary sponsor” of these efforts, the Massachusetts Restaurant Association figured prominently in the tobacco industry’s planned restaurant restriction rollback.14  Once again, tobacco industry involvement was limited to “resources and organizational activities,” such as providing the MRA with smoker mailing lists, letters to local officials, and telephone scripts.14  However, the TI also thought it prudent to use its own public affairs organization to “assist the local business people and coordinate a media campaign.”14  This would seem to have been an unwise choice, particularly since the tobacco industry was consistently determined to minimize public awareness of its involvement in the rollbacks.

            The year 1990 also saw the launch of Philip Morris’ “It’s the Law” campaign, which claimed to be aimed at curbing tobacco sales to minors.[15]  Educational, training, and display materials were distributed to retailers in all 39 states where the minimum age to purchase cigarettes was eighteen or nineteen.  The MRA was one of three co-sponsors of this program in Masachusetts.15  In addition, the MRA was listed as a general source of support for tobacco industry activities, specifically as a “state co-sponsor/participant” in 1991 and 1993, as indicated on an in-house directory of Philip Morris allies.[16]^,[17]

The MRA also worked closely with the tobacco industry in 1992, when it provided witnesses and community hearing attendees in Marlborough, where the Board of Health was considering a ban on couponing, self-service sales, the eighteen-year minimum age requirement for sellers, vending machine restrictions, and bans on advertising on public transportation.[18]  In this same year, the Tobacco Institute purchased “prime advertising space” in the MRA membership directory, which was distributed to members and allied members who constitute “75% of the buying power in the restaurant industry throughout the state.”[19]

1993-1995: A Uniform Statewide Solution to the Smoking Issue

            Many New England states, and localities within these states, considered adopting restaurant smoking bans in the early 1990s.  According to a May 1993 article in Yankee Food Service, a trade magazine for the food service industry in New England, restaurant and food service associations were fighting state and local restaurant smoking bans, while they seemed to be amenable to federal legislation in this area so businesses would not lose revenue due to cross-border sales.[20]  The food service industry’s position, however, remained that restaurant owners know how to best accommodate their customers, so it should be up to them to provide for the comfort of smokers and nonsmokers alike.20 

Cindy Eid, the Legislative Affairs Director for the MRA at this time, said in Yankee Food Service that “in light of the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] report [on the dangers of exposure to secondhand smoke] I think eventually what will happen is that OSHA [the Occupational Safety and Health Administration] will determine that smoking is hazardous to people’s health and ban it from the workplace – and a restaurant is a workplace.”20  Eid went on to say that if a national smoking ban of some type were implemented, the action would level the playing field and restaurant profits would not decrease substantially, “but, it’s our feeling that if it’s done at the state or local level, it puts our members at a disadvantage.”20  Until a national ban went into effect, it was Eid’s opinion, on behalf of the MRA, that “it should be left up to individual business owners to implement whatever standards are necessary to attract the type of customer he wants.”20

            In response to the EPA report released in January of 1993, some New England restaurant owners made their establishments smoke-free in order to assuage liability concerns.[21]  Other restauranteurs found support through Philip Morris’ “Accommodation Program,” a non-profit program to address restaurant owners’ concerns about tobacco smoke.21  A free Accommodation Program packet that was sent to restauranteurs included signage to clearly demarcate smoking and nonsmoking sections, information on HVAC upgrades to provide cleaner air in these establishments, a toll-free hotline staffed by HVAC engineers, and other materials that would address these issues and would also discourage restauranteurs from making their establishments smoke-free.21  In August 1993, Philip Morris stated that “restaurant owners know what their customers need and want, and they should be free to accommodate all of their customers as best they can.  Feedback from restaurant owners that have been using the [Accommodation] program has been very positive.”21

            In December 1993, the Massachusetts Senate was considering bill S. 458, a “unified statewide smoking bill that allows restaurant owners the freedom to determine their own smoking policies that accommodate all of their customers and does not handicap some restaurants and give advantages to others.”[22]  S. 458 was supported by the MRA for two reasons: it gave restauranteurs the power to decide how to handle the issue of smoking in their establishments; and it was a very weak bill that would have pre-empted all of the local restaurant smoking restrictions, which were generally much more stringent than S. 458. 

Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and the Tobacco Institute issued a statement of support for S. 458, saying that they understood why the MRA would support the bill, that they “recognize the danger of government intervention and the competitive issues that [restaurants] are faced with,” but that S. 458 sounded like “common sense legislation that will simplify and unify state law while giving back policy making power to the private sector.”22

The MRA’s Executive Summary on S. 458 contained a question and answer section so that its spokespeople would know how to address certain issues that would arise in interviews.  The issue that seemed to concern the MRA the most was how to answer questions about its links with the tobacco industry.  One section of the Executive Summary directed spokespeople to avoid answering the question “are you being used as a front group for the tobacco industry,” and instead to redirect the focus to S. 458.22  If asked, “is your whole effort being bankrolled by the tobacco industry,” they were supposed to say “no, but we certainly would encourage and appreciate any support the tobacco industry and anybody else for that matter can provide to help us get this legislation passed.”22  As for questions on statewide smoking bans and separate section restrictions, the MRA spokespeople were to respond that the MRA was “opposed to any kind of mandates.”22

In December 1993, during the Massachusetts legislature’s consideration of S. 458, Senator Lucile Hicks (R-Wayland) requested information on the economic impact of restaurant smoking bans from Stanton Glantz, a professor and tobacco control activist in California.[23]  Glantz had recently published a study that analyzed restaurant sales from 1985-1992 in thirteen California and Colorado communities that prohibited restaurant smoking, and compared them with sales in thirteen similar communities that had no such prohibition.23  The Glantz study concluded that smoke-free restaurant laws caused no loss of business.23

In his communication on this issue with tobacco control advocates and the press in Massachusetts, Glantz also alleged that the MRA and restaurant owners were fronting for the tobacco industry.23  Dr. Blake Cady, who was the president of the Massachusetts Division of the American Cancer Society, pledged to make a “major effort to fight off the tobacco lobby’s efforts, under the cover of the Massachusetts Restaurant Association, to endanger the health of the people of Massachusetts by stripping away from local communities the right to act to protect their citizens – including children – from exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke.”23  In the margins of this ACS press release, an employee at Philip Morris wrote, “do we have anything in our arsenal to combat Glantz study?”23  This statewide pre-emption bill did not pass, and communities throughout Massachusetts continued to consider and enact local restrictions and bans on restaurant smoking during 1994 and 1995.

Consequently, the MRA continued to oppose these smoking restrictions and bans, and publicly supported a statewide pre-emption bill so that the playing field would be level for all restaurants in the state.[24]  However, Cynthia Eid seemed to be the only MRA spokesperson who still publicly touted a national smoking ban.  In March 1994, in an article in the Boston Globe, Eid stated that restaurant owners would welcome “a national smoking ban, if only because it will be uniform from town to town, city to city, state to state.”[25]  After 1994, Eid’s presence faded from view in the news media, and Peter Christie, Executive Vice President of the MRA, became the primary public voice of the Association in the Massachusetts press.

Christie advocated for a statewide uniform legislative solution to the smoking issue that would allow restaurant owners to reasonably accommodate all of their patrons, while establishing policy consistency throughout Massachusetts.24^,[26]  Christie and the MRA endorsed Senate bill S. 508 in 1995, a statewide bill that mandated that restaurant owners make at least 60% of their seating nonsmoking and no more than 40% of their seating smoking, with any restaurant owner allowed to go smoke-free if he so chose.26^,[27] 

Bill S. 508 would have preempted local legislative activity on the smoking issue.  It also required that any changes to the statewide law be made only by city councils or township supervisors, “as opposed to local boards of health across the state.”27  Also under consideration at this time in the state legislature was a bill that would have “pre-empt[ed] local decision-making authority by imposing a complete ban on smoking in restaurants” throughout the state.27  According to a news article by Christie, “if we must have a law dealing with smoking in restaurants and bars, MRA prefers the uniform compromise.  It is far more rational and accommodating than an outright ban, and most importantly, leaves the decision up to the restaurant owner based on the needs of their customers.”27

1996: An Economic Impact Study, a Congressional Report, and a Public Relations Campaign

            In 1996, the MRA and the tobacco industry jointly commissioned InContext, an “information company” based in Washington D.C., to conduct a study on the economic impact of smoking restrictions on restaurants in 23 cities and towns in Massachusetts.[28]^,[29]  The towns included in the study passed smoking bans or restrictions between 1993 and 1995.  InContext concluded that, with little exception, restaurant smoking bans were detrimental to business, and this was demonstrated by their findings that the highest loss of restaurant jobs typically were concentrated in those Massachusetts communities with the strictest restaurant smoking restrictions.29

InContext and the MRA did not mention, in either the study’s Executive Summary, or in any of the publicity for the report, that five “college towns” also participated in the study.  College towns were defined as “those communities where the transient student population exceeds ten percent of the town’s permanent population base.”29  When restaurant smoking bans in every college town positively correlated with a significant increase in restaurant jobs, from 20% to 70% depending on the specific town, these results were excluded from the reported study results.  According to InContext, “for college-town restaurants both the seasonal cycle and the non-local customer target base are derivative of the local higher education facility, not the local economy” so there was “no meaningful correlation” between smoking restrictions and restaurant job gains in college towns.29

The MRA and InContext did not admit that any tobacco company or organization was involved in the financing, design, or production of the Massachusetts economic impact study, but several tobacco industry documents reveal that the MRA, InContext, and the tobacco industry collaborated on this project.  A Philip Morris (PM) memo dated March 1, 1996, stated that J. Dunham of PM “met with Bill Lilley,” the chairman and co-founder of InContext, “and Sharon Portnoy to develop a methodology for determining the economic impact of restaurant smoking bans.  Gave Lilley suggestions for completing New York City study … started work on Massachusetts restaurant ban study.”[30]  According to this memo, InContext produced a number of different economic impact studies for PM in a variety of states.30  A PM memo dated March 8, 1996, stated that J. Dunham “continued to work with Bill Lilley on study showing economic impact of restaurant smoking bans.  Met with Bill Lilley and Matt Paluszek to discuss similar study for Massachusetts … conference call scheduled for next Thursday with Matt Paluszek, Mass. Restaurant Assn, and Bill Lilley.”[31]

This same year, the MRA and the tobacco industry were joint proponents of study results released by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a “non-partisan research component of the Unites States Congress” that “responds to inquiries from Congressional offices by providing statistical and historical research for the policy objectives of legislators.”[32]  According to a memo from a Congressional staffer to the MRA, the CRS is “an independent branch of the legislature, with very strict rules about its non-partisan conduct and role … it responds to no exterior organizations or requests, and is accountable to the Government Oversight Committee.”32 

In 1996, the CRS released a study entitled “Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer Risk,” in which it examined the same 30 studies that the EPA used in its 1993 report on the health risks associated with exposure to secondhand smoke.[33]  According to a MRA press release that was “sent to 175 newspapers and used for a radio talk show pitch,” the CRS study concluded that “the statistical evidence does not appear to support a conclusion that there are substantial health effects of passive smoking,” and “it is clear that misclassification and recall bias plague ETS epidemiology studies.”33  The MRA used the CRS study to call into question all of the local smoking restrictions that had been passed or were currently being considered by local town officials and boards of health.33  Instead of restricting or banning smoking, the MRA called on town leaders to support the policy of accommodation for smokers, and said that accommodation was “supported not only by restaurant owners, but by the majority of all Americans, according to a 1994 CNN/Newsday survey.”33

Edward Sweda, the senior attorney for the Tobacco Products Liability Project in Boston, had a different interpretation of the CRS report.  According to Sweda, the passages that Christie quoted from the CRS report, and which appeared in many local and regional newspapers during January and February 1996, were manipulated by Christie and other “pro-tobacco apologists.”[34]  Sweda said that the “pro-tobacco apologists” were trying to “deflect public awareness away from the central issue regarding secondhand smoke: should nonsmokers, adults and children, be forced … to breathe the poisons contained in secondhand tobacco smoke?”34  Sweda then made a point-by-point analysis of a column published on January 12, 1996 in the Middlesex News by William Rusher, and Sweda quoted passages from the CRS study that contradicted the pro-tobacco interpretation of the report.  According to Sweda, it was “no surprise that more and more businesses and public places are going smoke-free, thereby ending the practice of subjecting non-smokers to [tobacco] poisons … that trend will continue despite the efforts of the tobacco industry and its apologists – including William Rusher – to confuse the public about how deadly secondhand tobacco smoke truly is.”34

The end of 1996 marked the beginning of the Tobacco Institute’s “It’s the Law” campaign, which was supposed to educate retailers about the illegality of tobacco sales to minors.[35]  Flyers were distributed to retailers, for use by employees that explained the law, how to ask for identification, and what to do if a customer refused to produce identification.35  The “It’s the Law” campaign packets also included order forms for materials, such as point of purchase signs and buttons, which were specific to each retailer’s state.35  In Massachusetts, the MRA was listed as one of four “cooperating organizations” for the Tobacco Institute’s “It’s the Law” public relations campaign.35  Other “cooperating organizations” that were based in Massachusetts (MA) or New England (NE) were the Coin Machine Industries of NE, MA Candy and Tobacco Distributors, MA Food Association, NE Convenience Stores Association, NE Association of Chambers of Commerce, NE Association of Tobacco and Candy, and the South Shore Chamber of Commerce.35

1997-1999: A Mixture of Success and Failure

            A July 1997 “Issues Update” report by RJ Reynolds (RJR) discussed a number of smoking restrictions that were being considered in localities throughout Massachusetts.[36]  Local boards of health were the primary catalysts behind the proposal of these ordinances.  This Issues Update indicated that RJR “met with [the] MRA on July 8 to discuss alternatives to present to the [Wakefield] Board of Health,” because restaurant owners wanted to change a two-year old smoking ban in this town.36  An Issues Update for October 1997 mentioned actions related to smoking bans and restrictions pending in 17 different localities throughout Massachusetts.  Among these updates, it was found that Amherst, South Hadley, and Amherst were conferring on the passage of a regional ban on smoking in bars, to supplement the restaurant smoking restrictions that already existed in these towns.   Again, the restaurant industry figured prominently in the opposition to these ordinances.[37]

            Local smoking bans and restrictions continued to occupy the attention of boards of health, the MRA, and the tobacco industry in 1998.  An April 1998 internal memo between employees of RJR indicated that “our partisans are prepared to challenge the [Falmouth] Board of Health with a series of questions and have speakers prepared to speak in opposition to the article [to ban smoking in restaurants], including restaurant owners, citizens, and the Chamber of Commerce.”[38]  The same week in April, RJR also noted that they were “working with the MRA to notify all partisans of [a] hearing [in Worcester on proposed new smoking restrictions] and [we] have a meeting on 4/21 at Tweed’s Restaurant to prepare for the hearing.”38  The 1998 President of the MRA, Jim Donoghue, who joined the MRA in 1982 and had been a member of its Board since 1989, owned Tweed’s Restaurant.[39]

            In July 1998, the MRA announced a lawsuit that challenged the Boston Public Health Commission’s (BPHC) ban on smoking in restaurants.[40]  These restrictions were adopted on March 19, and were scheduled to go into effect on September 30, 1998.[41]  The MRA filed a preliminary injunction against the new smoking regulations in Boston, because they claimed that: 1) the regulations were not “reasonable” under Massachusetts General Laws 111 s.31; 2) the BPHC considered economics when making this decision when they only had the authority to consider health; and 3) the regulations were “unconstitutionally vague.”[42]  On September 25, 1998, Judge Mitchell J. Sikora, Jr., of the Suffolk Superior Court ruled against the MRA, denying its application for an injunction against the BPHC’s smoking regulations.

The Massachusetts Division of the American Cancer Society issued a statement after the injunction’s denial, which called for the MRA to “sever all financial ties to the tobacco industry and put the health of their customers and patrons before the interests of Big Tobacco” in order to help make smoke-free dining a “profitable and winning combination.”[43]  In spite of the efforts of the MRA and the tobacco industry to block the Boston smoking restrictions, they went into effect on September 30, 1998. The BPHC’s smoking regulations mandated that over 1400 restaurants in Boston be smoke-free, and restricted smoking to the bar areas of an additional 200 restaurants with bars.[44]  An alliance between the MRA and the tobacco industry that produced mutually agreeable results beginning in the 1970’s, yielded mixed outcomes for both parties by the late 1990’s.

In 1999, many communities throughout Massachusetts, like Northampton, considered the passage of smoking restrictions and bans, while others, such as Amherst, faced tremendous opposition to bans that were already enacted.[45]  The MRA was an active participant in the opposition to the Northampton, MA workplace smoking ban because bars were included in the scope of the ban (see “Introduction,” above).  At the July 20, 1999 public hearing before the Northampton Board of Health, Andrea Bolton, the Legislative Coordinator for the MRA, not only referred to proposal of the ban as “ludicrous” and accused the Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program of being funded by Big Tobacco, but she also failed to address the testimony of a tobacco policy researcher who spoke earlier in the evening about the results of the 1996 MRA/Philip Morris/InContext study (see “1996,” above).6  Northampton was one of the five college towns that had been included in the 1996 MRA study but excluded from the study results.  The researcher speculated that since a restaurant smoking ban in Northampton resulted in a 20% increase in restaurant jobs in 1996, a bar ban in Northampton might have a similarly positive economic impact on the city’s bar business.[46]  Even though a bar ban might result in an increase in profits for bars in college towns, members of the food and beverage establishment were universally opposed to such a ban.  This seems to indicate that their indoctrination by Big Tobacco and the MRA has been successful.  Debate on the Northampton workplace smoking ban is ongoing as of the writing of this article, but it seems unlikely that a bar ban will be adopted in the near future.

REFERENCES