SHAMEFUL SCIENCE:

SHAMEFUL SCIENCE:

Four Decades of the Tobacco Industry’s Hidden Research on Smoking and Health

Norbert Hirschhorn, MD

Consultant to the World Health Organization

September 5, 1999

Introduction

I present here annotations of over 500 tobacco industry documents, along with much supporting material from other sources, that tell a four-decades’ story of the smoking and health research program sponsored by the members of the Association of Cigarette Industries of Germany ("Verband"). Its members include the German and Austrian cigarette manufacturers as well as the transnational firms of Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and British American Tobacco.

The documents were found in three locations: 1) On the websites managed by the American tobacco companies at <http://www.tobaccoresolution.com> ; these are marked # .

2) On the website that holds the 39,000 OCR’d secret "attorney-client privilege" documents subpoenaed by the US Congress, at <http://www.tobaccodocuments.org> ; these are marked * . 3) The Minnesota Tobacco Document Depository. Explanatory material is marked [N.B.....].

The annotations are presented chronologically except for the first two, which give the background of the German research program and tell why American firms became involved.

Some relevant documents are still to be found. While nearly all the documents annotated here come from Philip Morris and RJR, a large cache of British American Tobacco documents on the Verband are held at the BAT Depository in Guildford, England, and have not yet been seen. Nonetheless, what is presented in the next 128 pages adequately tells the astonishing story of corrupt science in the service of a deeply flawed product. The selected quotations will astonish even those who have become inured to what has already been discovered, "in their own words."

Beyond the petty squabbles and unpleasant characters, the story can be boiled down to a few essential themes that thread themselves throughout the annotations.

The company scientists had to struggle with the accumulating and on-rushing evidence that theirs is one of the foulest products (in the environmental sense) sold to be taken into human bodies. That struggle was seldom openly or honestly fought.

Even as some of the scientists hoped, in vain, to create the "safer cigarette," company lawyers were focused entirely on avoiding litigation, and loss when sued. An army of public relations experts, front-organizations, and corrupted consultants served the lawyers, not the truth; the companies, not the public.

The German tobacco scientists, led by the wily Professor Franz X. Adlkofer, managed to integrate and ingratiate themselves with leading researchers, academics and government officials; even with some who were strongly anti-tobacco. This gave the German industry the prestige and time to carry out research, and the ability to influence policy not just in Germany but throughout Europe and other continents, even until today.

The German scientists knew from the start that the true battleground was, and still is, passive smoking. Their worry was not so much whether smoking caused disease – they knew early on it did – but they were obsessed by the evidence that tobacco poisons released into the air could affect the health of nonsmokers; and they did everything they could to deny, distort, suppress, and finally ignore the overwhelming evidence.

The documents

* 27 June 1980, Edwin Jacob of the law firm Jacob & Medinger, RJR 50468-1987-8,

504682009 - 2011, ""James K. Johnston Smoking Issues - Briefing Book."

The legal briefing for an incoming CEO gives the history and suggests the rationale for the American cigarette companies’ interest in funding and directing the research done by the Verband

The European tobacco industry’s approach to the smoking and health controversy has always been markedly different from the approach taken by the American industry. Several factors probably account for this difference. -- In the early 1950s, the American industry was run largely by people with an agricultural outlook, who were basically skeptical of the claims being made about smoking. In contrast, the European industry, particularly the English industry, was dominated in its consideration of the health issue by chemists and other scientists who often lacked a biological background. These industry scientists saw the statistical association, saw carcinogens in tobacco condensate and concluded that the smoking and lung cancer causation claim was scientifically established. The European industry took the position from the beginning that they had a bad product, and that attitude prevails today. The commencement of litigation in the United States in 1954 encouraged an already skeptical American industry to maintain, if scientifically defensible, the view that the case against smoking had not been proven. The litigation also required lawyers for the American industry to find eminent scientists, from many disciplines, who were of the opinion that smoking had not been scientifically established as a cause of lung cancer. When they were found, they were encouraged by consultation with their colleagues and by continued analysis and research to maintain their views. With the absence of lawsuits in Europe, the European industry seemed content not to contest vigorously the claims made against smoking.... Particularly in England, the industry found that the questioning of government policy and the like by the few scientists who disagreed and who were encouraged in research by the industry was an embarrassment.... As a result of the difference from the U.S. picture, the European industry did not establish organizations to fund independent scientists who could investigate whether or not smoking is a cause of human disease. Instead, industry laboratories were established by the English industry at Harrogate and by the German industry in Hamburg, seemingly in order to examine how smoking might operate in the causation of disease... After the Royal College of Physicians Report was published in 1962, the response of the English industry was muted, not vigorously opposing the later developing views that remedial steps should be taken. Ultimately, this led to various restrictions on advertising, etc.... As to the German industry’s institute, it developed over the years the problems that the American industry had anticipated with an industry laboratory. The Germans have established a research program to replace their Institute. Meanwhile, the English industry has sold its laboratory (Harrogate) to Hazelton, which is still carrying forward some industry-financed research.... Recently, the European picture has become clouded by growing recognition of the possibility that litigation problems, formerly reserved to the United States, might now crop up in Europe and elsewhere.

* 23 July 1992, memo, Charles R. Wall to Murray H. Bring (both PM counsels), PM 2022850392 - 0402, "Philip Morris Research."

Wall describes funding to various individuals and institutions around the world (see documents for these names). With respect to the Verband, Wall gives the rationale for supporting research in Germany:

I view with some concern the research effort in Germany. The Research Council operates much like the SAB [Scientific Advisory Board] of the CTR, and supports research based on grant applications. Much of the research focuses on nicotine.... The Research Council’s budget is approximately 2,500,000 DM, of which our share is $519,880. There is additional research funded by the industry outside of the Research Council, and that amount is budgeted in 1992 at approximately 2,900,000 DM, of which our share is $603,060. It is this latter research that I believe could be reduced without a significant downside to the industry.... Our scientists feel, however, that it is important to keep the research money in Germany, i.e., continue to support researchers in Germany even if we are not supporting them through the Verband.... The relationship between the industry and the German government seems to be a good deal better than the relationship between the industry and the government in this country. As I understand it, there are regular consultations between government and industry scientists, as well as constructive discussions regarding smoking-related laws and regulations. The industry in Germany appears to be more influential with the government than the industry in the U.S. and, for that reason, the industry feels it is important to maintain a substantial research presence. Although I do not believe litigation is imminent in Germany, should it occur, the fact that we are sponsoring research -- whether through the Verband, or individually -- could be of substantial help, in convincing a court that we are fulfilling our duty to conduct research. Nor do I think we should downplay the importance of having scientific contacts in as important a country as Germany..

[N.B. In 1975, the Verband closed its Research Institute laboratory, leasing the facility to the German Government for a nominal one DM a year. According to the 1980 BBC Panorama program exposing the practices of the British American Tobacco Company, Verband did so because the Institute’s Director, Professor W. Dontenwill, had demonstrated laryngeal cancer in hamsters inhaling cigarette smoke (W. Dontenwill, et al. Journal of the National Cancer Institute 1973, vol. 51, 1781-1832), and cardiovascular disease in pigs. According to Panorama, a secret Verband meeting pensioned off Dr. Dontenwill with 1.6 million DM, the equivalent of ten years salary. The Research Institute was replaced by an "independent" research funding agency supported by the German and transnational cigarette industry, with a Research Council used to approve research proposals coming from various scientists and institutions.]

# 1 April 1963, "Draft International Agreement on Exchange of Information... [between] the Tobacco Research Council on behalf of its member companies. and the Wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle im Verband der Cigaretten-Industrie on behalf of its member companies," BAT (File no. B4908) 10536891 - 8919 (located in the Minnesota Tobacco Depository).

A contract on mutual information and cooperative research - a "gentleman’s agreement" to share results pointing to a cigarette less likely to cause cancer.

The Tobacco Research Council [UK] and the Wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle agree by this contract to submit to each other without delay the following informations which have to include all technological details of manufacture. These are: 1. Information about modifications to cigarettes or other tobacco products which have been shown to be beneficial to human health. 2. Information about modifications to cigarettes or other tobacco products the smoke or smoke condensate of which have been shown to produce less biological activity to an extent that was statistically significant, a) in a test (or tests) of a type that was relevant for lung cancer or other human diseases....Both the Tobacco Research Council and the Wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle respectively will endeavour to conclude equal contracts with AUSTRIA ABAKWERKE,Vienna...ADMINISTRAZIONE DEI MONOPOLI DI STATO, Rome...SERVICE D’EXPLOITATION INDUSTRIELLE DES TABACS ET DES ALLUMETTES, Paris...SVENSKA TOBAKS AKTIBOLAGET, Stockholm...VEREIGNIGTE TABAKFABRIKEN AG,Neuchatel.

[N.B. The first "gentlemen’s" agreement to share results leading to cigarettes causing less cancer. A 1983 memo by RJR Senior Scientist Alan Rodgman and Assoc. Director Frank Colby (17 December 1997, Deposition of Frank G. Colby "In The Matter of State of Minnesota, et al. V. Philip Morris, et al.," pages 54-5), "Smoking and Health Related Research Conducted by Philip Morris," relates that "Throughout the domestic industry, two gentlemen’s agreements operative in the early days," agreed that "any company discovering an innovation permitting the fabrication of an essentially safe cigarette would share the discovery with others in the industry;" and that "no domestic company would use intact animals in-house in biomedical research." This alone would have prompted the major transnational firms to look to the VdC to sponsor such research in Germany. * RJR 500877291 -7294, 6 December 1979, gives the statutes of the Research Council for Smoking and Health, its Secretariat, the Cigarette Industry Association and its Scientific Department. # PM 2001228258, circa 1970s, gives the organizational chart "Scientific Department of the Verband der Cigaretten-Industrie, directed by "Prof. Dr. med." Franz Adlkofer, with a Research Council for Smoking and Health and its Secretariat advising Prof. Adlkofer and the industry laboratory in Munich.]

# 21 May 1963, letter, from Loet Velmans, executive Vice President Hill & Knowlton International to Helmut Schanzer of Verband, RJR 501477795 - 7798.

Following closely on the April "gentlemen’s agreement" this is the first approach of an American public relations firm closely identified with the tobacco industry proposing to represent Verband and provide consultation, "with detailed suggestions on how to deal with the situation if and when the lung cancer controversy should become a major public issue in the Federal Republic." Hill & Knowlton work closely with Campbell-Johnson in England, another industry PR firm. Proposed consultants include Velmans (a former Dutch oil company consultant), Gerald Schroeder (German-born US citizen with ties to the 1948 presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey)), Gerta Tzschaschel (German journalist with close ties to the Bonn Government).

# 26 August 1964, minutes, "Discussion at German Forschungstelle." BAT (File no. B1725 at Minnesota Depository) 105532610 - 2611.

Lists members of the committee running the Verband: Reemstsma, B.A.T., Brinkmann, Neuerberg, and a representative of smaller manufacturers. "The first four members have 98% of the cigarette trade." Clearly, BAT is the only multinational member at this time through its German subsidiary. "The informal agreement between the German cigarette manufacturers to restrict advertising expenditure had recently been brought up to date and was still in operation."

* 13 August 1965, RJR 503272396, "Abstract of Scientific literature."

Earliest mention in industry papers turned over to Minnesota of research done at the Verband laboratory dealing with animals made to inhale cigarette smoke and the tumors produced.

* 19 July 1966, trip report, R.B. Griffith (Brown and Williamson researcher) to A. Yeaman (B&W in-house counsel), RJR 680204107 - 4114.

Describes visits to Industry laboratories in England, Sweden, Germany, France. The comments on the German industry labs reveal at this early date the rationale behind "smoking and health" research done by the tobacco companies, more for public relations and political advantage than for preventing disease.

[The Germans] have apparently convinced their Minister of Health that they know more about smoking and health than anyone else, that they are taking responsible actions, and he apparently turns to them for advice. The German companies seem to be working closely together, and have decided that no one can afford the luxury of a temporary competitive advantage in the smoking and health area. BAT, for example, has company-supported research which shows that "KRONE" [sp?], their newest brand, has 50% of the biological activity of other brands (based on mouse skin painting). They will not advertize this under any circumstance and presumably will make the processes used available to others when they are certain there is a health significance. They do not consider that they are in a vulnerable position because they are conducting mouse skin painting tests, but rather consider that this was essential in establishing their position with their Minister of Health. I consider the German industry to be in a better position than the industry of any other country, and hope that the U.S. industry can move in that direction.

* 15 January 1969, K. Caroll to M. Crohn, RJR 50381- 4318, "Inhalation experiments with cigarette smoke."

Cites Verband abstract of experiments with golden hamsters:

Long-term cigarettes smoke exposure in hamsters led only occasionally to tracheal papillomas and not to squamous cancer. However, one could sensitize these animals with diethylnitrosamine and enhance the tumor production initiated by this carcinogen by a variety of volatile irritants including tobacco smoke. [N.B. Nitrosamines are a product of burning tobacco, related to the nitrate content of processed leaf, and potent carcinogens.]

# 1971, "Smoking and Health...Comments of the VdC (Association of Cigarettes Manufacturers) released to the members of The Subcommittee on the Food Law Reform," , RJR 504834531 - 4532 (only title and first page available).

An early acknowledgment that smoking causes cancer, but with the implied belief that modern cigarettes with filters and lower tar might not be the same as smoked previously.

The cigarette industry does not dispute that statistical studies conducted mainly in the 1950's in the United States pointed up statistical relationships between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. It feels compelled, however, to state the following. Scientists agree that the latency period between cigarette smoking and the development of the disease amounts to several decades. Professor Schmael of the German Cancer Research Institute of Heidelberg set the latency period at 30 to 40 years. This means that findings obtained today must be attributed to a cigarette consumption that goes back over several decades. The cigarettes on the market today in Germany, at any rate, can no longer be compared in any way....

# 4 October 1974, Paul Isenring to various Philip Morris staff and affiliates including Donald Hoel, Shook Hardy & Bacon counsel to ICOSI (International Committee on Smoking Issues, an industry-sponsored public relations institute), "Germany ‘Verband’." PM 1003727787 - 7790.

New German food law, if rigorously applied, could create advertising ban on tobacco "plus education programs to curb down cigarette consumption." Public Health Minister objected to Reemtsma’s new nicotine-free cigarette. With the industry being attacked, Verband needed much more "scientific material" on smoking and health, particularly as the French Monopoly claimed their darker cigarettes were healthier than the "light" German cigarettes (fewer smoke, less inhalation). Verband sees necessity to disprove the claim, and also to produce "safer" cigarette.

* 18 July 1975, Don Hoel (Counsel, Shook, Hardy and Bacon) memo to A. Holtzman (Philip Morris), PM 2024964938.

"A recent television program [in Germany] described smoking as ‘the most important single risk factor’ in cardiovascular disease causation.... Additionally, the contacts of the Verband with the Health Ministry are diminishing because of the influx of anti-smoking crusaders in that agency." Further bad news was the possibility that Reemstma, the only wholly German-owned company might leave the voluntary advertising code of the Verband, which could cause a "blowup" of the Verband, and the imminent dissolution of the Verband’s Research Institute with the "golden handshake" to its Director Dontenwill who found laryngeal cancers in hamsters exposed to smoke.

* 24 July 1975, Frank Colby letter to Wilfried Dembach (RJR lawyer in Cologne, Germany), RJR 500259565 and 500259421.

Colby offers to keep Dembach abreast of all the research on health and smoking, published or not. Those not in the public domain "may, please, not be quoted in any shape or form."

[N.B. Frank Colby, a chemist, was RJR’s manager/director of research and scientific information from 1951 to 1979; associate director of scientific issues from 1979-1983; a consultant working out of the Jacob & Medinger law firm, which represented RJR, for some years after. He was a refugee from Nazi Germany, got his doctorate at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. Colby’s position description with RJR states under "principal accountabilities, first "Efficiently provide the technical expertise necessary for the Company to combat anti-tobacco claims." 17 December 1997, Deposition of Frank G. Colby "In The Matter of State of Minnesota, et al. V. Philip Morris, et al.," page 67.]

# July 1975, no author, translated from the German, "Germany -- ‘Verband’. Reflections towards PR-work of the Cigarette Industry." PM 1000219760 - 9768.

Increasing attacks on the cigarette industry, supported by the Federal Health Ministry. The Verband was not prepared to respond to the attacks. Author suggests that an "information service" be created to influence the media, medical community, health authorities, etc., which would be incorporated in the USA (the "International Tobacco Science Information" [perhaps ICOSI - International Council on Smoking Issues] to serve in different countries. In Germany, Dr Kirch (pro-tobacco medical author of "The Cigarette") would be editor of a newsletter published by RAU-publishers in Dusseldorf. Verband and the US Tobacco Institute would supply the basic information. A brief booklet for smokers and tobacco industry workers would deal with "anti- tobacco propaganda." "Like for all other stimulants and food -- it is the exaggeration which can be harmful." Assertion of hazards from passive smoking is "an exceptionally effective ‘weapon’" in the hands of anti-tobacco forces, and needs to be countered. News releases, smokers’ newsletter, etc. to be distributed through tobacconists shops (750,000 copies).

# 24 October 1975, Paul Isenring (Philip Morris) speech to Managing Committee of Verband,

"‘Smoking and Health’ --The Industry Policy Today and in the Future." PM 2024965269 - 5271.

With anti-tobacco movement becoming more active in Europe ("Everywhere, there are heavy tax increases, in various countries based on the ‘Smoking and Health’ issue."), led by WHO, the response from the European and German industry has been "silence," as each company seeks only market shares, not a common, industry-wide policy. In particular, German manufacture of "lighter and lighter cigarettes...low in nicotine in smoke or nicotine free.... Do we really want to dig our own grave in this manner." The threat is the destruction of the Tobacco Industry, prohibition of smoking. The important questions to be answered are:

1) Can the Industry, in Germany and in Europe, continue to keep silence or is it ready to work out a new policy which should consist in bring the fact of the scientific controversy with regard to "Smoking and Health" and to the importance of the industry in general, to the knowledge of the public, government, parliament?

2) In this context, the product policy regarding the low in nicotine smoke cigarettes and the nicotine free cigarettes may be reconsidered. This would be in the highest interest of the smokers -- our customers -- and therewith of our industry.

# 5 November 1975, minutes of discussion following Isenring’s presentation,

"Re: PR activity and "Smoking and Health."PM 2024965211 - 5217.

Discussants agree a public relations activity is needed (along the lines of the 18 July 1975 proposal), at least to counter the statistics published by the Federal Government on 140,000 smoking-related deaths a year, and "DM 20 milliards as cost for social consequences." Discussants were exercised about possible prohibition of smoking at work places, "especially dangerous as the sales would be severely affected through such a measure." Chairman of the meeting, Mr. Dieter von Specht (of the BAT Cigarettenfabriken GmbH), suggested a Research Council be established to recommend to the German Industry what research should be funded. Despite the warnings by Isenring and PM/ Switzerland’s Helmut Gaisch, von Specht declared that "The objective of the Research Council should be to support projects from which positive indications regarding a ‘safer cigarette’ could be expected." Another point of contention was the Verband’s desire to include Ernst Wynder (developer of the mouse-skin cancer assay and one of the early scientists to link smoking to lung cancer) on the Research Council. PM objected.

* 24 February 1976, Colby Memo for the Record, "Conversation with Dr. Koenig of the Verband in Hamburg." RJR 500293555 - 3556. [N.B. Harold Koenig was the Chief Administrative Officer of the Verband laboratory.]

Discussing a two-day symposium, the first to be dedicated to "biased" research, the second to the beneficial effects of smoking. "Even though I did not discuss this with Dr. Koenig, the obvious danger there to me could be a new emphasis on low tar and nicotine."

* 28 April 1976, memo, Colby to H.D. Rickert (RJR in-house counsel), "Spengler contract," RJR 502741260.

As you may know, Ed [Jacob], Tim {Finnegan] [both of Jacob, Medinger & Finnegan] and myself prepared a lengthy document commenting on the research projects which are planned on behalf of the German Cigarette Industry, some of which are clearly detrimental.

* 4 August 1976, letter, Colby to Dembach, RJR 510715323.

Sends along comments by RJR scientists on some particular research protocol ostensibly from the Verband: "This is of course a purely scientific evaluation which may or may not be overriden by political considerations."

# 17 November 1976, Paul Isenring memo to several persons, "Germany -- Verband -- Research project. Beneficial Effects of Smoking." PM 1002610069.

Isenring want s Verband to contact the Tobacco Institute, BAT-Germany, Philip Morris-Germany to coordinate with their US-based companies. Philip Morris could consider such a project and its approach.

# Circa 1976, Verband’s public relations plan, RJR 500257486 - 7487.

Shows early entry of Verband into the PR field, unrelated to tobacco research. Items include the following aims: "Proving the scientific irrelevance of the thesis that passive smoking damages the health of the non-smoker.... Outlining the benefits of smoking; reassuring the smokers of their habit....Ridiculing the lunatics of the anti-smoking-league....Furthering the image of smoking as a desirable social habit." Techniques include direct mailings, approaches to media, government, medical groups.

* 26 April 1977, memo from Colby to Edwin Jacob (Jacob & Medinger Law Firm), a hand-written translation from the German by Colby of the first two pages of a 20+ page Verband position paper on Smoking and Health. RJR 500269280 - 9281.

The topics listed are: "Basic position of the [German] Cigarette Industry. Problem of ‘passive smoking.’ The development of cigarettes offered in the German market. Reduction of condensate, gas phase, and plant protection agents. Does smoking of mild cigarettes lead to higher consumption? Advertising of tobacco products: Voluntary restrictions of advertising by the German Cigarette Industry. Warning labels on packages. The cigarette as entrance to drugs?"

The first chapter is translated:

The cigarette industry does not dispute the point that statistical studies conducted in the United States in the fifties indicate a statistical correlation between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. The cigarette industry also does not deny that tobacco smoke contains carcinogenic substances. However, animal experiments conducted in independent institutions throughout the world have shown that we are dealing here with relatively weak carcinogens. As a result, only very large doses of smoke condensate or tobacco smoke seemed to produce tumors on a small number of experimental animals. The doses were so large that, if conclusions from animal experiments can be transferred to man, they would correspond to completely unrealistic number of cigarettes.

* 3 June [probably in 1977], Colby letter to Dieter von Specht (BAT Germany), "Re: Verband (Adlkofer) Nicotine Research Concept." RJR 500281851 - 1853.

Colby presents numerous arguments, based on considerations of scientific experimental design, why Franz Adlkofer (Medical Research Director of the Verband-funded laboratory) should abandon plans to study nicotine effects on animals through inhalation. Colby notes that lawyers Ed Jacob and Wilfried Dembach had already spoken with Adlkofer on the subject. Adverse findings from such experiments might be used by "our adversaries." This relates to the threat that the FDA might regulate tobacco if claims were made on the benefits of nicotine, thus all such research should stop.

* 22 June 1977, Colby memo to the record, RJR 502740064.

Colby decides not to provide additional funds to Verband, "We have been in disagreement with the whole program altogether." Hopes to influence Philip Morris Europe to follow suit.

* 1 July 1977, Colby "Unedited Draft Notes," "Some Thoughts On Selected Highlights of an Information System for the Verband der Deutschen Cigaretten Industrie Purpose." RJR 500273956 - 3958.

Colby notes are clearly meant to be addressed to the German tobacco industry, offering to build a scientific library in Germany similar to what he had built in the USA. He hopes other European manufacturers would help subsidize the effort. The purpose includes having appropriate literature to respond to attacks on the German cigarette industry in the area of smoking and health, but also to help the Research Council ("Forschungsrat") evaluate research proposals, and to be abreast of cigarette technology and additives.

# 8 July 1977, Colby trip Report Notes, RJR 511074355 - 4357.

Colby uses a "confidant" within Verband to try convince Dieter von Specht "to affect the policies of the Verband regarding smoking and health.... to achieve a less compliant attitude toward the Government and anti-tobacco medical establishments in Germany." He also obliquely criticizes continued support to Ernst Wynder to study bladder cancer [presumably as a result of smoking], Verband support of research on nicotine as a co-carcinogen, and on smokers’ "compensation" [when smoking light cigarettes].

* 29 July 1977, Colby report, "Report on trip to Europe, October 1976. 1. Project on the psychosomatic aspects of lung cancer. Prof. Dr. Blohmke, Dr. Baltrusch, Mr. Jacob." RJR 500949347 - 9348.

This reports seems to set the structure for RJR overseas funding of research. It would not involve Americans, funding would come through RJR’s legal representatives but kept a secret.

The general conditions for the research grants were mentioned to them.... [among others] that specifically no US researchers would be involved.... I assured them that there would be complete freedom of publication but that we would reserve ourselves the right of vetoing any mentioning of the financial support received from Haus Neuerburg.

* 14 September 1977, memo, Colby to H.C. Roemer (RJR counsel), "Blohmke project," RJR 504312107.

One of the first indications of American tobacco companies’ intentions to ship tobacco research on smoking and health overseas, with strict control over the work shared by RJR’s German counsel and US-based scientists who reported to home-office counsel and U.S. law firms.

In my judgment, it is desirable to send a substantial amount of money to R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, GmbH, Germany, in order for them to have funds available for the Blohmke project.... Wilfried Dembach has suggested that a formal letter be sent to him and he has proposed the following draft: "Our Company is interested in doing [hand-stricken, substituted with "the support of"] medical research outside the United States. With regard to the funds [hand-written insert: "for research in Germany"] we provide you with the necessary financial means up to an annual budget of U.S. dollar 250,000.00. The projects themselves should be handled by yourself on behalf of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco GmbH, Germany. All details, especially the issue of the research and the scientists, shall only be determined after our expressed approval. [N.B. The "Blohmke Project" was research into the psychosomatic origins of lung cancer.]

* Approximately September 1977, Colby draft report to W. Dembach, RJR 502741197 - 1200.

Colby is concerned about several persons the Verband will appoint to the newly established German Tobacco Research Council. He is dead-set against a Prof. Schettler:

...not a good scientist...his endorsement of margarine and the financial support he has enjoyed from the German margarine industry...endorsing some cardiovascular drugs without scientific justification but because he was ‘subsidized’ by the firm marketing such drugs...Schettler is vehemently anti-tobacco and interprets and often distorts any data in a manner which is as anti-smoking as possible.

Colby also against a Dr. Valentin because it came out that he was being financed by the tobacco industry when he spoke against bans on public smoking, although he had denied such payments at the time - it would provide ammunition to adversaries. Further, Dr. Adlkofer "has consistently shown poor judgment regarding scientific matters." Especially as the new arrangement of Verband, the Research Council will be for Adlkofer to "dream up" the projects and the Council to "consent." Colby insists RJR withhold financial support under such an arrangement. Colby feels it is unethical to pay Ernst Wynder to be on the Council.

Wynder is totally and uncompromisingly opposed to smoking and his advocacy of the ‘less harmful cigarette’ is only an intermediate step to weaning the smoker totally. The only ‘useful’ result which could come from such payments would be him reiterating his statements that the German cigarettes are the lightest cigarettes on the world market.

Colby finally insists that Verband give "firms, including, of course, RJR three months in which to approve a research project as per prior agreement."

* 2 November 1977, letter, Alan Rodgman (RJR senior scientist) to Dembach (RJR German counsel), RJR 515972148 - 2152.

Rodgman objects to Verband spending money to research phosgene (a chemical resulting from freon expansion of tobacco leaf, which bulked up and therefore lessened the amount of tobacco used per cigarette) in tobacco smoke. He provides the Dontenwill data on hamsters exposed to cigarette smoke (twice a day for 120 weeks) with and without phosgene and shows freon-untreated tobacco seemed to reduce tumors in the hamster larynx by about a third. Here we see in an industry document the Dontenwill data that may have led to his involuntary and premature retirement: Comparing expanded to control tobacco, 22% and 34% of hamsters, respectively, had either cancer or benign papillomas with 10% and 6% having actual malignant cancer.

* 29 November 1977, Colby memo to RJR in-house counsel H Roemer, "Contact with the German Cigarette Trade Association." RJR 503247230 - 7240.

Comments on his discussion with Franz Adlkofer (scientific director of the Verband- funded research laboratory) that while Adlkofer had "the ability to understand the scientific realities and the political background of the smoking and health controversy.... However, unfortunately, his convictions do not seem to last, and he is swayed easily and will not always stand up for his convictions." Notes that Wynder’s bladder cancer proposal was turned down "because R.J. Reynolds-Germany had protested against it."

# 20 December 1977, Helmut Gaisch (Philip Morris International) letter to Herbert Bentley (Imperial Tobacco Co. - a BAT subsidiary), RJR 500298998 - 8999.

Curious to find a PM letter to Imperial in the RJR files. Gaisch complains about Verband’s independent ways. The letter and attached Colby aide-memoire also shows how the principal members of the tobacco industry tried to suppress research that might throw bad light on their product; or lead to standard measurements that, perhaps, could lead to regulation; and only condoning experiments to discredit results negative for the industry. Ironically, standard FTC measurements of mainstream smoke tar and nicotine are strongly defended by the industry in contrast to the more realistic measurements under real-conditions of smoking.

Last week on 15^th and 16^th of December, scientific meetings took place at the headquarters of the German Verband in Hamburg on the subject of passive smoking. I had delegated Dr. Fink of our laboratory on behalf of Philip Morris Germany. He had been briefed by me to follow the policies outlined by I.C.O.S.I. [International Council on Smoking Issues, an industry information and PR organization]. In particular, I had drawn his attention to the fact that it had been found by I.C.O.S.I. not to be in the interests of the industry to experiment to much with sidestream smoke as this could lead to the development of standard methods for sidestream smoke determination, something we would like to avoid at all costs because it is scientifically nonsense. Instead we would like to deepen as quickly as possible our knowledge as to the measurement of ambient smoke under realistic conditions.... As it turned out, some company scientists present at the Hamburg meeting did not seem to feel bound by the I.C.O.S.I. view. I very strongly feel that we must make sure that the objectives of I.C.O.S.I. are followed by company scientists, otherwise we risk detrimental effects for industry.... The German Verband has, in any case, a tendency of going their own peculiar ways.

Appended to the letter is a memo note from Colby date 4 January 1978:

I telephoned Dr. Gaisch on January 3^rd, explaining to him that I had rectified matters with the Verband during my visit with them on December 16^th, 1977, and that we had come to a tentative understanding: a)that they would not do any testing of sidestream smoke, such as developing standardized conditions, etc., except as stated under (b). B) That the only work which would be commissioned by the Verband would be to re-run all the experiments and only the experiments described in the Brunneman/Hoffman papers, to determine whether the values were accurate. c) It was understood that, subject to agreement by ICOSI Committees, etc., any measurements of environmental nitrosamines under real life conditions (as opposed to Neurath, etc. sidestream collecting device), would be carried out via ICOSI.

* 21 February 1978, Colby memo to Roemer, "Excerpts of minutes from the latest meeting of the P.R. Committee of the...Verband." RJR 50028-0674.

Verband P.R. Committee warns about the impending referendum in California to curtail public smoking. "It is also important not to underestimate its potential opinion-molding effects on the German public."

* 15 March 1978, S.B. Witt (RJR in-house Counsel) letter to Hume Stewart-Moore(Chairman, Gallaher, Ltd.), RJR 50233-0421.

This memo shows the interesting connectedness of German researchers who were looking to show carcinogens in cigarettes (and thus try make their removal possible) with the Verband. One of Ernst Wynder’s colleagues, Dietrich Hoffman, had published data in the 1960s with Wynder showing the tumorigenic effects of cigarette smoke. In the late 1970s he was working on nitrosamines, but also writing a position paper for Verband on passive smoking. The international companies kept doing their best to limit any damage German researchers could do.

I understand that an accommodation has been reached between the German association (Verband) and Dr. Hoffman which will be incorporated in a redraft of the Position Paper on Public Smoking; essentially it will acknowledge that from a scientific standpoint Dr. Hoffman’s work is not relevant.... Finally, we heard during the course of the session on Friday that Philip Morris has done some work essentially aimed at ‘discrediting,’ if that is not too strong a word, the methodology used by Dr. Hoffman.

* 22 March 1978, letter from Colby to Edwin Jacob of Jacob & Medinger,

"RE: Nitrosamines and sidestream smoke/Germany." RJR 500281911.

Colby objects to continued Verband funding of Dr. Dietrich Hoffman ("of the Wynder group") whose research on second-hand smoke was "not obtained under real life conditions," and whose "unrealistic data will be quoted against us." Adlkofer promises Hoffman will separately and personally present his future proposals to the German Industry scientists, with Colby in attendance.

* 29 March 1978, memo to file, S.B. Witt, RJR 500549438 and 500549441.

Discussion of national research and role of ICOSI to set up standards for measurement of smoke constituents, and to report out research favorable to the industry.

At the outset, Dr. [Herbert] Bentley [Imperial Tobacco/UK] announced himself in favor of "staying close to national associations to make sure they don’t embark on research which might be embarrassing for us," which was music to our ears.... Spengler mentioned the work of Dr. Hoffman in Germany [on nitrosamines], and the work of the Verband to disprove his theories. PME is also doing research to discredit Hoffman’s theories, and has offered to make it available to ICOSI.

# 29 March 1978, Philip Morris’s Paul Isenring memo to "Hoffman", PM 2501025100, "ICOSI-Public Smoking Paper."

Urges coordination and a "modus vivendi" between the two principal law firms representing the industry, Jacob & Medinger (RJR) and Shook, Hardy & Bacon (Philip Morris, Tobacco Institute and other US tobacco companies), and their involvement in European issues.

* 30 March 1978, Colby memo to RJR in-house counsel Samuel B. Witt, "ICOSI Working Group of the EC." RJR 50094-4076.

Colby advises Witt that an ICOSI [International Council on Smoking Issues] be explicit about why cigarette companies are producing low tar and nicotine cigarettes - a matter of competition, not to promise health benefits. If the German Industry does not change its "basic attitude," Colby suggests strongly that RJR-Germany resign from the Verband.

* 21 April 1978, memorandum from P. Isenring to CD Durden, on ICOSI - EEC Task Force on Consumerism, PM 2501025098.

A response is needed to an EEC paper, "The Tobacco and the Health of the Consumer."

It will require working from an industry paper previously submitted to the EEC on public smoking, drafted by the law firm of Jacob & Medinger, and that the Verband should lend its materials.

* 1 June 1978, Colby memo to Senior RJR Scientist Alan Rodgman, "Information for Dr. Laurene’s weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs." RJR 500885524.

Alerts Rodgman to "Some potentially forthcoming changes in the smoking and health research policies of the German Cigarette Manufacturers Trade Association (Verband)," discussed with lawyers Dembach and Jacob.

* 19 June 1978, Colby memo to RJR in-house counsel R.C. Roemer, RJR 500280584.

Wants himself and Ed Jacob to speak to Verband before they actually make the changes in their research policies.

* 17 July 1978, Colby letter to Wilfried Dembach (RJR-Germany counsel), RJR 50028-1041.

I am planning to start a major file for future reference documenting the thesis that advertising does not sell cigarettes, but sells merely switching from one brand to another. Please send me all the material you have on this topic.... include whatever material may be available from the Verband. [N.B. First indication of Colby moving off from his expertise as a chemist and scientist.]

* 28 July 1978, abstract of publication, in German, from the Verband, "NOT TO BE GIVEN OUT WITHOUT FGC O.K.", "Some Definitions on the alleged carcinogenic and co-carcinogenic effects of tobacco smoke condensate." RJR 510826747 - 6748.

Definitions include primary carcinogens such as benzo(a) pyrene, tumor-initiators or promoters such as dibenzanthracene and phenol, co-carcinogens that with another substance accelerate formation of tumors such as catechin. Anonymous author notes that no mechanism is known to distinguish a promoter from a co-carcinogen.

* 3 August 1978, Colby memo to D.R. Piel, "Information for Dr. Laurene’s

weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs." RJR 500885513.

At the confidential request of the German Cigarette Manufacturers Association, I have drafted a "Letter to the Editor" on behalf of a German scientist associated with the Verband responding to the recent paper by Aronow on passive smoking. Some informative material was sent to the Verband and other measures were undertaken in order to prevent them from organizing a symposium on carbon monoxide, which has a potentially damaging effect on our Industry.

* 17 August 1978, memo from Colby to H Roemer (RJR in-house counsel), copies to outside legal counsels (Hoel, Jacob, Witt), "PR Committee Meeting Minutes -- Germany." RJR 500280787.

Quotes Adlkofer’s views on smoking and health controversy:

In considering the more recent publications of mortality statistics on lung cancer and heart attacks in the U.S.A., Great Britain and West Germany, as well as the studies by Hammond, Wald, and Wynder, one can come to the conclusion that the mild cigarette is not necessarily the answer, as frequently asserted, to the health risks related to smoking. Dr. Adlkofer’s viewpoint much indicates a notion that a cigarette with a relatively high nicotine content and a low condensate content [i.e., tar] is the cigarette of the future.

# 31 August 1978, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman, "Information for Dr. Laurene’s weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs." RJR 500885509.

Comments on British Hunter Committee (Independent Scientific Committee on Smoking and Health) Report, its second on smoking and health, likely to be as critical of tobacco as the first, and urging Government regulation. Discusses "unpublished Wynder data" on alleged paradoxical epidemiological findings on smoking and cardiovascular disease, discussed with Dr. [Gary] Huber and the Verband.

# 1 September 1978, Colby memo to H.C. Roemer, "German ‘Compensation’ Study." RJR 503647069.

The study under Verband sponsorship will not be supported by RJR-Germany. Colby, Jacob, Dembach will discuss this study as "one of the topics" in the upcoming September 11 meeting with Verband’s Drs Koenig and Adlkofer.

* 28 September 1978, Colby report to H. Roemer, "Discussions with the Verband." RJR 503240579 - 0582.

Colby strongly discourages Verband from any research on nicotine and compensation. "I consider the nicotine oriented research concept and the planned research derived therefrom to be totally worthless." Colby is particularly incensed by the concept of "compensation" to increase nicotine intake, when at the same time the Verband has given up researching the beneficial effects of nicotine. "...at worst, only a small minority of smokers are adversely affected [by smoking]....

All the other cigarette companies have reversed themselves and have now decided not to participate in the compensation study."

Colby seeks to besmirch the reputation of a cancer specialist, one whose research cast a negative light on cigarettes:

I obtained some information from a reliable source that the head of the current German Industry Finance Research Council on Smoking and Health, i.e. Prof. Schmaehl, a widely known expert in chemical carcinogenesis, has and is receiving financial kickbacks from some of the current research grantees of the (Verband financed) German Tobacco Research Council. I was also informed that these were kickbacks for personal use and not some possibly defensible contribution towards Prof. Schmaehl’s own research projects.... From still another source, I was informed that indeed Prof. Schmaehl is ‘in great financial need’.

* September 1978, Colby to Roemer, RJR 503240499 - 0502.

Concern about leakage of scientific information, connections between scientists from different companies and countries, tied to fear of litigation in the USA. "In a US law case...foreign files may not be immune to subpoena.... We then discussed a potential future mechanism for how to control undesirable contacts by ICOSI member companies or national trade associations from one country with scientists from other countries and how to develop such a mechanism without jeopardizing our German companies funded research contacts." [N.B. Colby wrote "contacts," not "contracts."]

* 3 October 1978, Colby memo to H. C. Roemer, "German Claims Alleging Filter Cigarettes Allegedly Less Safe Than Regular Cigarettes." RJR 501790036.

I have just been informed that a sensationalist type German magazine called "Quick", has published an interview with Prof. Schettler of Heidelberg University. In this interview Prof. Schettler alleges that smoking is the most "important" risk factor in cardiovascular diseases. He also alleges that the newer filter cigarettes are not "safe" either, but are, in effect, less so than the regular old style cigarettes.... One of the most noticeable facts about this story is that Prof. Schettler is the second most important research grantee (after Dr. Wynder) of the German Verband. I had tried unsuccessfully for years, repeatedly, to convince the German Industry that Prof. Schettler was a person not to be trusted and had even given them some information about some questionable dealings he allegedly has been involved in with the German drug industry. I also warned them that he was using the cigarette Industry as a scape-goat to bolster his integrity. The fact of being able to say "I told you so" provides slim satisfaction if weighed against the unfavorable effect such a blast must have on the German Industry as a whole.

* 5 October 1978, Colby report H.C. Roemer, "Discussions with the Verband on their suggested nicotine research concepts." RJR 503247193, 503247196, 503247198, 503247200 - 7210.

Colby comments on recruiting German scientists to do tobacco research: About a Doctor Dieter Neubert (who wanted to research the effects of tobacco on fetuses), "When we first saw him, there was no possibility to ‘investigate’ him, but since that time a literature search of him has been made and no adverse statements on smoking have been uncovered to date."

Colby continues:

It has been extremely difficult in the past to recruit the above discussed German research grantees and reading hundreds of papers published by them. Even for each of the research grantees it took several persistent contacts before they showed enough confidence in the seriousness of our endeavor to "seek out the truth" and to fund their research "without any strings attached...." Our original approach "gambit" was to tell them that we had been trying for several years to convince our U.S. parent Company to authorize our German and other European Companies to fund research in Western Europe and, firstly in Germany, because of our convictions that some research in Western Europe in general, and in Germany in particular, is at least as good as the best U.S. scientific efforts.... It was also generally agreed that it would be desirable to maintain our relationship entirely confidential....We believe that the results to date already assure us we will be able...to show the Verband that it is possible to support first rate research by top quality scientists from Germany’s most prestigious institutions where the research is open in the sense that like all worthwhile research, results are not foregone conclusions or, in other words, worthless. [N.B. Given the low opinion Colby and others had of German research, there was clearly another motive, as shown in the next sentence.] At present we cannot expect that any of our current grantees would consent to be a witness in the eventuality that our German Company would have to defend itself in a liability case. However, W[ilfried] Dembach seems to think that no such witnesses will conceivably be needed before 1980. [N.B. The appendix to this report gives the sequence of dealings with Dieter Neuberg, indicating his value to RJR was more as a prestigious scientist than his research.]

Colby then reports on the September 11 meeting in London with Drs. Adlkofer and Koenig; attending were Ed Jacob, Dr. Charles Nystrom, Colby, and Dembach.

Mr. Jacob then proceeded to explain the dangers of nicotine research from the point of view of the Industry, with special reference to the threat of the American Industry being placed under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration. He also mentioned that some work of the Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A. on nicotine "receptors" had to be terminated because of a possibility of such work being wrongly interpreted of having commercial implications. Dr. Koenig then claimed that he was aware of the specific problems of the American Industry supporting nicotine work in Germany through its German affiliates which could be alleged to be related to such problems as addiction. Dr. Koenig and Dr. Adlkofer then stated that in their judgment it was desirable to find out more about the effects, if any, of nicotine in laboratory animals on cancer, arteriosclerosis, pregnancy, etc. Mr. Jacob then state that under no circumstances would Reynolds support any research in Germany that we would or could not support in the U.S.... We then somewhat forcibly and -- deliberately -- overbearingly extracted from them an unequivocal promise that before any effort which was made to commence or in any other way start a specific research project, RJR -- like the other member Companies of the Verband -- would have a minimum of three months to evaluate each proposal.... Almost all of the meeting in London dealt with the legal perils and related aspects of the concepts on nicotine oriented research of the Verband.... I also tried to explain to Dr. Adlkofer and his associates why I considered the other "cornerstone" of his research concept, i.e. the so-called compensation study, scientifically totally worthless. [N.B. Jacob’s concern was that research showing putative benefit of nicotine would lead FDA to classify it as a drug, hence regulate it in tobacco.]

Colby goes on to suggest Adlkofer stick to basic research on human disease "alleged to be associated with tobacco," however, ‘by definition,’ such research could not deal with tobacco.

Colby then turns to the Chairman of the Research Council, a Prof. Schmaehl, who "a widely known expert in chemical cancerogenesis, is receiving financial kickbacks from some of the current research grantees of the (Verband-financed) German Tobacco Research Council...for personal use."

* 8 December 1978, Colby memo to H.C. Roemer, RJR 500871996.

As an example of its "watergate" endeavors, the German Verband has made funds available to Dr. Wynder for his American Health Foundation [in New York City], to be the front in financing a Symposium on carbon monoxide,held in Berlin in October (‘78) .

# 6 February 1979, Report by A.W.M. St. Aubyn to Philip Morris, "Visit to Verband der Cigaretten-Industrie, Hamburg, 30th and 31st January 1979." PM 2501159601 - 9607.

A comprehensive review of the Verband activities including public relations and responses to attack, "at arms length," that is, through third parties: publications and films for the public and health professionals from independent film makers and publishers; comparing all risks to health; aligning with specialist physicians; presenting a positive outlook, not offensive, to maintain the social acceptability of smoking. Two paragraphs stand out:

Risks. The type of clandestine operations in which the VdC is involved clearly carry certain risks of detection, by such people as investigative journalists, of the link between the industry and the end product. HK [Harold Koenig] believes that the precautions they take are sufficient to enable the industry to be able to deny any link and says that such risks as remain are acceptable to the VdC member companies.

By this form of combined approach the German industry seems to have defended itself better than many countries from the worst excesses of the various anti-smoking lobbies and has maintained a higher standing for itself and its product in the public mind.... [M]any of the methods used there could well be suitable for adaptation to the U.K. context.

* 2 March 1979, VdC Tabakforschungsauschuss (TFA -- Tobacco Research Board) meeting notes taken by Bernd Pelz (RJR Germany) [N.B. Pelz eventually goes to work for RJR’s Foxfire Plantation, a tobacco growing station in the USA], RJR 500920533 - 0534.

Nitrosamine research by a facility identified as Austraton approved, carcinogen studies by Prof. Schmaehl rejected. A study at Austraton on the effect of smoke of smoke on DNA repair in hamsters is mentioned (no details) as well as Dr. Scherer’s literature review on co-carcinogenic properties of nicotine.

Adlkofer felt it was impossible to decline Schmaehl’s suggestion (political consideration and not suggesting a modified research protocol [Adlkofer suggests applying condensates on mouse skin from cigarettes with varying tar: nicotine ratios and from cigarettes made 30 and 10 years ago.] The committee members felt that such research would not reveal anything new.... [They] were unanimous in saying that they see no clear cut need for an alternative proposal.

* 26 March 1979, Letter from W. Dembach to Dr. E.B. Brueckner, Research Society on Smoking and Health, RJR 500924525.

Letter advances RJR payments for research projects invoiced but notes that RJR is only paying for projects it has already approved, not new projects not yet reviewed.

* 19 April 1979, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman, "Information for Dr. Laurene’s weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs. RJR 501627697 - 7700.

This is one of the few "attorney-client privileged" documents that is additionally heavily censored ("privileged material redacted"). A hand-written cover sheet reads "Please read & destroy without making copies."

Surprisingly, the Verband had decided to invite Dr. Gori, apparently without checking ahead of time with the member firms, more specifically with RJR-GmbH.... Dr. Gori "buttonholed" me a the Verband meeting and asked me point blank whether "I agreed that the German Tobacco Industry is sponsoring research which would not be permitted by your lawyers in the United States." I thought it futile to deny the obvious or to reply that I could not comment. I stated therefore that we only had a very small market share in Germany and that our influence was therefore limited. (Confidential). [N.B. Gori was employed at the National Institutes of Health, heading up the smoking and health program; he sought for years to develop a "safe" cigarette.]

* 26 April 1979, Colby trip report to Max Crohn, "Trip to Germany...some highlights-mainly on Verband grantees meeting..." RJR 504821254 - 1256.

As others and I predicted several years ago when this Council was first organized by the Verband, the outcome was the worst of two possible worlds; (1) Poor, or at best, mediocre science, (2) Most of the findings were negative from an Industry point of view. The only somewhat favorable aspect of the activities of the Council is that it probably helped the Verband establish a non-confrontation, though not an amicable relationship with important German Government Health and related authorities....

* 23 May 1979, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman, "Information for Dr. Laurene’s weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs." RJR 500885452 - 5453.

Colby attended the Scientific Technical Advisory Group of ICOSI in Brussels, and provided "intelligence" on Philip Morris/Europe, BAT, and Imperial.

PM/E has had for several years, as a wholly owned subsidiary, a major commercial research institute in Cologne/Germany, which does animal and other biological research. PM/E has completed a study on analyses of cigarette, respectively filter tip, stubs, comparing tar/nicotine intake of cigarettes about twenty years ago, i.e. mostly non-filter cigarettes having high nicotine/tar deliveries, vs. Recent cigarettes, i.e. mostly filter cigarettes having high nicotine/tar deliveries. The results allegedly show that there is no substantial difference in nicotine intake by Swiss smokers as a whole... [I] can not make a judgment how valid the PM conclusion is that there is "compensation."

In the same memo Colby noted the retirement from BAT of senior scientist Dr. Green, soon to be a whistle-blower.

* 29 May 1979, Colby report to S.B. Witt, "Philip Morris/Europe." RJR 500942103.

Verband and Dr. Schmaehl (German Cancer Institute) managed to get a paper on nitrosamines by an ex-PM reseacher, now with Wynder’s American Health Foundation, presented at a seminar sponsored by Schmaehl. Colby also reports that PM is enlarging their R&D facilities in Neuchatel, and "has had for several years, as a wholly owned subsidiary, a major commercial research institute in Cologne/Germany, which does animal and other biological research." In Neuchatel they discovered that Swiss smokers using low tar/low nicotine filter cigarettes get the same amount of nicotine as when they smoked the old non-filter high tar and nicotine cigarettes. Colby tries to downplay the importance of this finding: "This type of study requires a great many assumptions."

# 4 June 1979, Memo from BATCO’s D.G. Felton to S.J. Green, L.C.F. Blackman (BAT researchers), "Meeting with Philip Morris’s Dr. R. Seligman (V.P. R&D) and Dr. T.S. Osden (Director of Research) Philip Morris Research Center, Richmond, USA." Minnesota Depository BAT (File no. C12) 100429313 - 314.

They commented that, in their opinion, ICOSI was a ‘conspiracy by Reynolds and Imperial to thwart BAT and Philip Morris’ in their international operations. They clearly did not trust Colby or Jacob and said that the Verband staff (Konig and Adlkofer) had found Jacob a trial. I said that I understood Jacob had advised ICOSI that there was danger in working on nicotine for a variety of reasons and that might have had repercussions for the Verband."

* 3 July 1979, Redacted Colby attachment of abstract of a study by German scientist to lawyers Witt and Jacob, "Effects of Smoking on Human Umbilical Veins." RJR 511286585.

Pathological changes found in umbilical arteries and veins of children of smoking mothers, and not in non-smokers. Related to low birth weights of such children.

* 19 July 1979, VdC TFA meeting notes by Pelz to W. Dembach (RJR German counsel), RJR 503247057 - 7058.

Members express great dissatisfaction "with the way the TFA is handled by the VdC."

They complain of wasted money ("unless one rated the public relations effect that high"), that research was not being used to produce new cigarettes, and that Adlkofer had arbitrarily chosen the members of the new Forschungsrat (research-proposing and grant-making body of VdC).

# 20 July 1979, Colby letter to Dembach, "Re: Verband Executive Meeting, June 26, 1979." RJR 500920451 - 0453.

Colby comments on a paper Verband intends to send to the German Medical Weekly. "I find especially the comments preceding the actual report on the...reference to alleged adverse health effects of smoking, as well as the references to the ‘less harmful cigarettes’, scientifically unacceptable and politically unpalatable." Colby also objects to Verband research on polycyclic hydrocarbons and electrostatic precipitation of cigarette smoke - particularly because adversaries would "manipulate" the methodology and information.

# 2 August 1979, Colby memo to RJR in-house counsel S.B. Witt, "Verband grantees." RJR 503247017.

Colby complains of the Verband report, "Research grantees," where "some comments which wrongly allege that cigarette smoking is harmful."

* 5 August 1979, Colby letter to Dembach, RJR 50872449.

Colby likes a Prof. Krokowski’s "open-minded attitude towards smoking for years," and notes that he is "the first good potential candidate to serve as ‘witness’." [N.B. Colby was the first to develop a method of recruiting "friendly" scientists and medical doctors by careful screening. The method was formalized a decade later in the Asian and European ETS Consultant Projects, among other such programs to find friendly witnesses for litigation and testimony at legislatures.]

# * 8 August 1979, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman (RJR Senior Scientist), RJR 502443594- 3595.

The sometimes cosy relationship of the Verband with government officials is illustrated here: "Some time ago Don Hoel, of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, received a request from the Chief Executive of the Verband [von Specht] – who is also the Chief executive of B.A.T. Germany – to furnish him ‘pro and con’ material on nicotine for the purpose of transmitting it to an anti-tobacco bureaucrat of the European Economic Community. To my astonishment, Mr. Hoel complied with that request as made."

* 28 August 1979, Colby letter to Franz Adlkofer, RJR 500872130.

Colby expresses the need to hide RJR’s sponsorship of University research in Germany:

As I informed you, Dr. Koenig, etc., several months ago, we, i.e. R.J. Reynolds GmbH in Cologne, are sponsoring a limited amount of ‘smoking and health’ research in German Universities. At that time I also advised you that these projects would have to remain confidential between the researchers and ourselves until data ready for publication would be available.... Attached please find the manuscript of the first of these studies.... Please keep this manuscript confidential until publication, and our involvement in this project should, please, also be kept confidential until advised otherwise.

* 29 August 1979, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman, RJR 50162-7508, "Monthly status report." RJR 503247017.

Among other activities, "Obtained confidential information on the relationship between the British Tobacco Industry and the Hunter Committee."

* 5 September 1979, Colby draft memo to RJR in-house counsel S.B. Witt, "RJRTI funding of smoking and health research in Germany and elsewhere." RJR 500950146- 0148.

$750,000 over three years. Purpose of research is to fund "impeccable" smoking and health research. But under that rubric is the substantial reason, recruiting spies and witnesses:

To establish relations of mutual trust with leading scientists -- beyond the grants – as scientific advisers, as a resource to find "witnesses" – if needed – for liability litigations, governmental bodies, etc., as a confidential source of information on the activities of our adversaries, etc.

Projects funded by the Verband often done by scientists hostile to the tobacco industry: "Obviously, ‘politically’ such data are doublu damaging if financed by the industry.... Funding ‘impeccable research also means to exclude...researchers prejudiced against the Tobacco Industry.

* 14 September 1979, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, "Verband Smoking and Health Research Grant Procedures." RJR 503246989 - 7011.

Colby outlines the grant making procedures of the Verband, "adopted over our objections."

1) There will be projects submitted by, or solicited from various university and research institute scientists. These will be evaluated as to their scientific merit by the new German Tobacco Research Council (see below). However, the Executive Board of the Verband reserves itself the right to veto or otherwise control publication. 2) The Verband, i.e. Adlkofer and company, will originate other projects and choose their researchers within Germany and, possibly, also outside Germany, in a form akin to what we call in this country "contract research." For this type of project the Verband plans also to reserve itself the right to veto or otherwise control publication.... Chiefly due to Ed’s [Jacob], Wilfried’s [Dembach], and my initiatives, the Verband has agreed that all member companies will have three months to comment, before any irrevocable commitments are made. (I am, however, skeptical whether the Verband will always be scrupulous in observing this.) Any company has the right to withhold its funding from any project. Similarly, there seems to be an unwritten understanding that any member company may veto any of the projects.... The Verband has asked approval of a specific research proposal ("Effect of carbon monoxide and nicotine on minipigs"), which in the judgment of Dr. Pelz and myself, is totally ill conceived. Also, nearly all the scientists of the other firms are against this project.

Colby also objected to some appointees to the Research Council, "personal friends of Dr. Adlkofer." especially Prof. Schettler.

* 19 September 1979, Colby memo to S.B. Witt - includes portions of 5 September 1979 memo, , "RJRTI Financed Smoking and Health Research in Germany to Date -- 1977-79." RJR 500877333 - 7342.

Colby describes the kind of research RJR has funded: 1) Whether lung cancer and/or smoking are associated with a person’s psychological makeup, war experiences, religion, etc. $200,000 annually. 2) Whether the handwriting of lung cancer patients can reveal characteristics associated with lung cancer. $18,000. 3) Enzyme markers in human cells predicting susceptibility to lung cancer. "The CTR-USA and other organizations have spent millions of dollars on this concept.... Results to date have been disappointing and the original concept is now very much in question." 4) Toxicologically caused cancer "threshold" theory. "Incomplete results to date -- involving chemicals in no way related to tobacco -- have not turned out as hoped for." $110,000.

5) Epidemiologic study of total Cancer rates in Hamburg, corrected for shift in population and improved diagnoses, have not changed, but locations of cancer have [Colby doesn’t specify!]. $25,000. 6) Comparison of "annoyance" from second-hand smoke to other industrial odors. $35,000. 7) Dr. Neubert’s studies on [voluntarily] aborted fetuses from smoking and non-smoking women. Obstacle to study is a change in voluntary abortion methods. Neubert proposes going to animal models. $48,000. 8) Chain-smoking Prof. Staecker believes extroversion causes both smoking and "certain respiratory patterns." $58,000.

# 24 September 1979, Colby memo to Dembach and Bernd F. Pelz [N.B. Pelz was RJR- Germany scientist assigned to keep track of Verband deliberations and operations, see RJR 50087738.], "Verband Research Projects Approval." RJR 50094522 - 4523.

Colby confirms the Verband procedures as outlined to S.B. Witt 14 September 1979. Emphasizes need for close RJR review of ALL proposed projects (not just those, apparently, funded by RJR). "These projects need not only be assessed from a purely scientific point of view, but also from a legal point of view (i.e. Sam Witt, Ed Jacob, etc.)."

* 5 October 1979, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, "Verband Research Project -- Umbilical Cords Pathology." RJR 503246995 - 6996.

Colby writes, "The Verband is planning to undertake a new research project which is described in the attachment. I am planning to advise Wilfried Dembach and Bernd Pelz as follows, provided you approve." He objects not to the research (ostensibly looking at cords of infants delivered to smoking and non-smoking mothers) but to the researchers who have been associated with or published research on pregnancy and smoking or on minipigs, "which are mostly very anti-smoking," and "a serious embarrassment to the German Industry."

# 5-8 November, 1979, synopsis of conference, unsigned, "Smoking and health issues conference. BAT (Minnesota Select set, BOX 11, File no. FC0077) 301097811.

The German example indicates that the industry’s greatest ally is its consumer. The Verband shows that a dialogue through third parties with the scientific community on the health aspects of smoking can reflect well on the industry and avoid isolation.

* 19 November 1979, memo from Bernd Pelz to W. Dembach, "VdC-Tabakforschungsausschuss (TFA)-Meeting." [Verband Tobacco Research Committee.] RJR 500877295 - 7298.

Second of a number of reports by Pelz, assigned to report on the Verband research deliberations. The TFA became the successor to the Forschungsrat (Research Council). The researchers discussed the need to "do something about nitrosamines in smoke." Pelz reports, "Heavy metals in smoke. This discussion I regard a personal victory: there will be no research follow-up by the Verband on the publication by Prof. Mueller on Cadmium in tobacco."

* 19 November 1979, VdC TFA meeting notes by Pelz to Dembach, RJR 500920074 - 0078.

Much discussion on nitrosamines in tobacco and the need to reduce their levels. Discussion of cadmium in tobacco. Evidence that the different companies had to be careful of their competitive advantages, and not share research ideas. A secret side-note to RJR USA reveals how VdC is influencing a European Commission Literature study on tar and nicotine.

Nitrosamines in beer to him [Fink of PM/Neuchatel, FTR, Fabriques Tabak Reunies] are not an issue any more after the changes that were introduced by the brewing industry.... [H]igh nitroso-nornicotine (NNN) values found by Hoffman were also found in experiments by PM. Dr. Klus essentially reached the conclusions made by Fink, that tobacco industry should do something about nitrosamines in smoke.... Seehofer [BAT] wanted to know from Dr. Fink what leads he would use to get a reduction of nitrosamines in smoke. Fink said they would work on it, but was not in a position to say more.

Heavy metals in smoke: This discussion I regard a personal victory: there will be no research follow up by the Verband on the publication by Prof. Muller on Cadmium in tobacco, and unless necessitated by outside pressure the subject will not be on the agenda of the Committee for the next year.

When discussing the problems of Coresta, it became pretty obvious that practically all companies for competitive reasons have restricted or put a ban on scientific publications. Dr. Fink (PM) for example reported that in general 3 out of 4 potential publications are rejected [by his company].

European Commission Literature Study (This is strictly confidential and not for outside use) The EC Commission has contracted the Fresenius Institute to do a literature survey on the determination of tar and nicotine and other toxicologically relevant constituents of tobacco smoke. The VdC has been in touch with with Institute since Spring 1979 and is supplying cost of the literature. Dr. Fresenius in discussion with selected TFA members....

# 20 November 1979, translation of memo by E. Brueckner of the Verband to Verband members, "regarding biological experiments," RJR 50087-2076.

A clear alarm that non-industry government research could harm the industry, and acknowledging the link between cigarettes and lung cancer.

We have just been informed on a confidential basis that a leading German research institute is doing, on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, inhalation experiments on the effect of cigarette smoke on lung retention of dusts. Asbestos is also included in the experiments. The researchers have been requested to use conditions which simulates actual real life conditions as closely as possible. For that reason they use in their experiments several (German) cigarette brands which have a high market share. It seems questionable whether the results to be expected will, in all cases, lead to an exoneration of cigarettes, especially since we know from the United States that 97% of the asbestos workers which died of lung cancer, were smokers. We will continue to follow this topic and explore whether or not we will be able to use our influence.

# 21 November 1979, Edwin Jacob memorandum to files, "Meeting With Executive Board of Verband re Research Structure November 13, 1979." PM 100012218 - 2222.

I had referred to the statement of research concept agreed with Konig [Harold Koenig] during our meetings last year...and changes were made in the draft statute for the Research Council, as follows: I) References to product development or improvement were eliminated from the statute. ii) No scientific approval of the Verband or members of the Industry will be required for specific research projects. iii) There will be no requirement that the Council make recommendations with regard to product improvement.... Part of the problem [how to engage company scientists in the Council review of projects] might be in asking the wrong question. It is not helpful to obtain negative reaction of the scientists and then go forward on political grounds. It might be more helpful to tell the scientists that a political decision to do a project has been made and invite their cooperation in making it as effective as possible, given whatever the political parameters might be.

* 28 November 1979, Richard Marcotullio (RJR "Managerial Employee"), memorandum to file, "ICOSI International Public Smoking Symposium." RJR 502122792 - 2797.

Long soliloquy about a major conference on public smoking whose industry sponsorship the Verband wanted kept secret, otherwise it "would preclude the ability to attract the participants desired," that is, the best scientists, as well as the expected participation of the World Health Organization. Marcotullio and others were of the opinion that this should be an industry show, not a venue for scientific or legal debate or controversy. If anything, the pressure on individuals to stop smoking ought to be raised as "debate" with the intention of "discrediting the other side." Therefore, only participants siding with the industry should be on the program, "producing testimony and a report which can be used with legislators." The three aims of the symposium would be to produce a useable book, provide media coverage ("highly organized"), and to "neutralize WHO as best as possible on the public smoking issue." "In addition, the symposium was intended to establish witnesses, international sociologists, lawyers and scientists that the industry could count on in other areas." [N.B. The proposed convener of the conference is named simply as "IO", a local branch of an international group, one with good relationships to the Verband and also to the World Health Organization. "IO" probably stands for "Interim Organization," the entity that bridged the 1979-1980 transition from ICOSI (International Center on Smoking Issues) to the more controllable INFOTAB. See * RJR 503328264 - 8272, particularly -8767.]

Of interest in this memo is the close coordination with law firm principals, such as Mary Covington of Covington & Burling, Don Hoel and Charles Tucker from Shook, Hardy & Bacon ("Kansas City"); and the major manufacturers BAT, Imperial, Philip Morris, and RJR.

* 30 November 1979, Colby memo to Pelz, "Adams ‘Compensation’." RJR 503247368.

[N.B. "Compensation" refers to smokers of low tar, low nicotine cigarettes inhaling more deeply and longer to get the requisite amount of nicotine their bodies demand.]

For reference I attach two recent papers by Dr. Adams. As I am sure you are aware, the "politics" of Imperial "demand" that there is no compensation. The Verband’s politics have changed radically in that the late Dr. Weber insisted that there was no compensation, but now Dr. Adlkofer wants to show compensation. In my judgment, as regards the majority of convinced smokers, there is compensation ...[but] is only partial

over the long run...from the point of the smoking and health controversy...this is probably meaningless. This is because there is no way of determining the smoking behavior changes -- if any -- of the very small number of smokers who may or may not be "at risk" with regards to diseases allegedly associated with smoking.

* 6 December 1979, Colby to S.B. Witt, RJR, the Research Council for Smoking and Health and Verband "Statute" and declarations of purpose, in German (undated) and partially translated to English. 500877291 - 7294. [N.B. The English translation of the Purpose of the Research Council is totally redacted from this document.]

In rough translation, the statute declares that the purpose of the Research Council is to discover, on the basis of present knowledge, if or how nicotine, alone or interacting with other substances, takes part in the pathogenesis of chronic illnesses associated with smoking. Because of the importance and extent of this area of work [smoking and health], nicotine research

is at the center of the activities of the Research Council. Basic research will take suitable note of and be based on clinical studies. In certain instances work with other scientific disciplines will give meaning to the results.

# 13 December 1979, Meeting notes from Bernd Pelz distributed to Colby, Dembach, Alan Rodgman, H.J. Weder, S.B. Witt, "VdC Scientific Committee (TFA) Meeting, Hamburg Dec. 12, 79." RJR 500920366 - 0372. [N.B. TFA stands for Tabak Forschungs Ausschuss, Tobacco Research Committee.]

Scientists at the meeting represented BAT, British Imperial, Philip Morris, Reemtsma, RJR, VdC, and Austria Tabakwerke.

A paper on nitrosamine levels in many brands of cigarettes from different nations was published by Drs. Ruhl, Adams, Hoffman in a reputable but Verband-financed German tobacco research journal ("Beitrage zur Tabakforschung [Contributions to Tobacco Research.."]. It was felt "not what one would like to see" but an attempt by the Verband to suppress it would be undesirable given the cooperation of the German Federal Health Office in the study. The Reemtsma representative objected, however. The same Dr. Adams continues to show compensation behavior of "light cigarette" smokers. Pelz then related a discussion about the Verband with two company scientists (Austria Tabakwerke and PM) on the way to the airport. "They both said that approval of Verband research was more or less based on a general judgement as to what potential harm a piece of research could do." Pelz’s own role in insisting on more information about research protocols, they warned, could lead him to be marginalized. Both scientists said appointment of Adlkofer to head the Scientific Committee was a mistake "because this would add too much influence to the Verband. They would also prefer to have the chairmanship in the hands of members of industry."

# 17 December 1979, Marcotullio memorandum to the file, ICOSI - International Public Smoking Symposium." RJR 502122771 - 2778.

Soliloquy continued from 28 November, with an apparent change of heart by the ICOSI at a 12 December meeting attended by writer, and law firm principals Ed Jacob and Charles Tucker. The memo indicates the Industry’s need and ability to influence the World Health Organization away from an active anti-tobacco stance.

The WHO Sub-director [Tibblen] has apparently been offered by the proposed public sponsor of the symposium, the ‘IO’, and the ‘IO’ has apparently indicated that while the sub-director will not be totally on our side his remarks will be fairly moderate. It was also felt that this would add to the credibility of the symposium in that it would not be totally one-sided.... Controlled controversy rather than balanced controversy.... If Tibblen makes his point.... The response to Tibblen will comes from carefully briefed and placed floor discussion people.... The Verband has full control over the ‘IO,’ Resulting from a long history of cooperation between the Verband and the ‘IO’.... Trevor King of Imperial Tobacco expressed his concern that WHO was being asked to be a party to a ‘balanced’ conference’ where its views were then going to be discredited. He further questioned why the ‘IO’ would want to put itself in this position and [Christian] Vogel [of ICOSI] responded that ‘it’s a question of who is the biggest supporter of the IO.’ Julian Doyle [ICOSI director] then commented that the ‘IO’ was apparently chosen because of its relationship with WHO.

Further discussion of how to organize the symposium centered on whether "IO"/ICOSI should act as the convener with secretive funding to come through the Verband. The Americans (industry and lawyers) objected because of the possibility of discovery, the Europeans refused a symposium where industry sponsorship was openly known. The circuitous solution was for Verband to support IO sponsorship, with other and more neutral sponsors also sought, and the industry role in sponsorship not be proclaimed but not denied either if asked.

* 20 December 1979, Colby letter to Jacob, commenting on Pelz’s report of

13 December 1979. RJR 500872965.

Company scientists don’t understand "that most of the research funding by the Verband will not be funneled through the Research Council, but directly via contract research." Colby still insists on a three-month review period by RJR (and other firms) of all research proposals.

* 10 January 1980, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, " Smoking and Health and Related Activities for Germany, etc." RJR 500882843 - 2845.

Job description for Bernd Pelz. Essentially to "monitor and assess any and all activities of the Verband:" scientific, legislative, court testimony, support of scientific meetings, contacts with researchers outside Germany, contacts with tobacco trade associations and tobacco companies outside Germany. Colby notes two kinds of funded research - Verband support of projects cleared by the Research Council, which require limited monitoring "provided they stick to their agreements," and contracts funded by tobacco companies directly, which require more extensive review with three months notice.

* 10 January 1980, Colby memo to Dembach, "Verband research on smoking motivation by Bergler." RJR 500882850.

Verband commissioned research on the role of advertising "is obviously a sensitive topic and in my judgment, it falls under the subjects where there should be some input from Winston-Salem, before any commitments by RJR are made."

* 14 January 1980, VdC meeting notes by Pelz to Samuel Witt (RJR counsel) Alan Rodgman and Frank Colby (RJR scientists, Dembach and Weder (RJR German counsels), RJR 500882856 - 2857.

Discussion of merits of the Cambridge filter versus the electrostatic trap for measuring tar and nicotine, and establishing international standards that would make the cigarette companies look good, as the two methods produce different results. Obvious attempt at gaming the system.

When using ventilation to reduce carbon monoxide in cigarette smoke, nicotine is reduced to a lesser extent than tar, i.e. the measured T/N ratio becomes smaller. This is basically desirable, but should not become apparent in measured and labeled values.... There are reasons to believe that the taste impact of a product is determined by its T/N ratio. To achieve a low T/N ratio, the possibility should exist to have the nicotine as high as possible, without this becoming apparent. Since the electrostatic trap reduces tar more than nicotine, compared to the Cambridge filter, i.e. increases the T/N ratio, the use of the electrostatic trap thus runs counter to the interests of industry. The attempt of Health Authorities in various countries to reduce the tar values also would make it appear more desirable to have the international standards produce higher tar values to have a wider lee-way.

* 14 January 1980, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 502856873, "False allegations made by German semi-official Health Insurance."

The Dusseldorf branch of the semi-official German Health Insurance, which insures about 70% of all West Germans, made the following false allegations: 1. "There is a cause and effect relationship between cigarette smoking and various diseases."

2. Tobacco advertising induces children and young people to smoke." 3."Smokers are insufficiently informed regarding the effect of smoking on health." The Verband has replied over the signature of Mr. von Specht regarding point 1. That "risk factors" are not synonymous with causation, and that relationships between smoking and health are a matter of controversy.... Regarding point 2, the Verband stated that not a single study backs up the insurance’s claim.... Regarding point 3, it was pointed out that all press, radio and TV polls have come to contrary conclusions.

* 18 January 1980, Colby draft of memo to S.B. Witt ("no copies"), RJR 500882851 - 2855, "Smoking and Health in Germany."

Suggestion that all is not well as Colby complains of not being informed on all issues and by all meeting minutes, whether from the Verband Tobacco Committee (TA, a technical group comprising one R&D scientist from each company), the Tobacco Research Committee (TFA, the policy level committee headed by Dr. Adlkofer), and the Executive Board (made up of CEO’s of each of the member companies or their delegates, who scrutinize all research proposals). Colby still strongly objects to nicotine and compensation studies, which appear to be going ahead despite his protests.

* 25 February 1980, Richard Marcotullio memo to S.B. Witt, "Germany -- Legal action against Reemstma." RJR 502122978 - 2979.

Advises that the leading anti-smoking group in Germany, Physicians Working Group on Smoking and Health (led by Professor Schmidt) is suing Reemstma for using posters with a young, healthy model advertising "Brand X", suggesting no ill-effect from smoking in contravention of the German Food Law. The case is being taken by an avowed anti-smoking judge, whose wife is also a judge and a "paranoid" anti-smoker." Another lawsuit is being instituted by a long-time smoker (smoking the same "Brand X") who suffered a heart attack and was told by his physician that smoking was the cause.

* 29 February 1980, letter from Samuel Witt (RJR counsel) to Alexander Holtzman (PM counsel) with meeting notes of the VdC Scientific Committee 14 February, RJR 500880088 - 0091.

This report shows the concern early on from the German side of any findings implicating tobacco as a hazardous product.

Adlkofer adds a new member from Reemstma, against the VdC Board decision to limit each company to one representative. [N.B. VdC Board is made up of the CEOs of the several companies, therefore the policy-making committee where politically sensitive scientific questions are decided.] Research proposed on mainstream and sidestream smoke for carboline compounds [polyaromatic hydrocarbons]. A mention of an Austrian Professor Kunze who relates tar levels with lung cancer; a paper by Ruhl and Hoffman on nitrosamines scheduled for the industry journal Beitrage zur Tabakforschung [Contributions to Tobacco Research]; that a 1979 German list of exposure to workplace chemicals mentions smoking for the first time.

Dr. Klus [Austria Tabak] reported about the situation in Austria, where Prof. Kunze is going public with ‘tar exposure numbers’, i.e. where he relates incidences of lung cancer to tar exposure. The formula he is using is number of cigarettes smoked X years of smoking those cigarettes X tar factor = exposure number. The tar factors he is using are... less than 15 mgs... 15-24 mgs... 24 mgs. And exposure number below 500 is equated by Kunze to a low risk of cancer; above 2500 to a substantial risk, and above 5000 to a high likelihood of cancer. The additional problem with Kunze is that he is publicly blaming certain brands for being dangerous.... Austria Tobacco Co. is currently preparing a defensive position paper....

Except for Reemstma, all committee members feel that a letter of the kind proposed by Dr. Adlkofer...would induce Hoffman to withdraw the paper, and allow everybody to save his face. Reemstma will ask the VdC Board for a final decision. Reemstma may also want to discuss the usefulness of the existence of Beitrage in general.
Looking into the future Adlkofer said he expected the work of the new Forschungsrat to be neither beneficial nor detrimental to the interests of the industry, and its prime significance being that of a positive public relations effect.

* 6 March 1980, Colby memorandum for the record, " Re: Meeting with Dr. Adlkofer, March 6, 1980 in Houston, TX." RJR 511468214 - 8215.

Colby quotes Adlkofer as saying that he believed "risk factors were more or less synonymous with causation." Colby relates further, "In the sum he believes that smoking ‘causes’ lung cancer, heart disease.... He also believes that low ‘tar’ low-nicotine cigarettes are less harmful."

* 11 March 1980, memorandum from Robert Seligman (PM scientist) to Alexander Holtzman, PM counsel, "RJR Meeting notes from VdC, PM 1000122363 - 2364.

Commentary on VdC proceeedings – the RJR notes seem to make the rounds. The entire memo is worth quoting for the legal cover that is being thrown up around the science.

Thank you for sending the meeting notes written by Mr. Pelz. I found them very interesting. You asked for comments and they follow: The statement by the President of the German Federal Health Office that people compensate when smoking low-tar cigarettes is a bit disturbing. I don’t believe there is factual proof that this takes place. [N.B. This was known to the industry by the mid-1970s.] To have a Federal official infer that low-tar cigarettes are industry instigated rather than marketplace dictated is erroneous and should be challenged. The VdC’s interest in harmane/norharmane and the carboline compounds is significant. The harmanes we know are present in smoke and the carbolines may be present in smoke. Some of the latter compounds are extremely carcinogenic and have been claimed by Dr. Sigimura of Japan of being the "ultimate carcinogen." Professor Kunze’s (of Austria) exposure numbers and inferred relationship to the likelihood of cancer is an extremely dangerous development. It makes the Hertzfeld index and the Gori Index child’s play. It is particularly damaging if he publicly cites specific brands. On the subject of Beitrage, it would be most unfortunate if this publication ceased. It is the one publication of international stature within tobacco technology groups. Listing smoking with other chemicals is an unfortunate precedent. I’d hate to see "threshold limiting values" for Marlboros in U.S.A. industrial sites. I’d be pleased to have your comments on the above. [N.B. Harmane and norharmane are of the alkaloid class of carbolines, "fused-ring N-heterocyclics"; harmane has some use in Parkinson’s disease but the chemical class may be precursors to nitrosamines. See Schmeltz and Hoffman, "Nitrogen containing coumpunds in tobacco and tobacco smoke," Chemical Reviews 1977; 77: 295-311.]

* 14 March 1980, Colby letter to Dembach, RJR 504339741.

To the best of my information, lung cancer has been increasing in German fairly steeply between 1955 and the present. All this does not jibe with German cigarette consumption. For example, between 1933 and World War II, German cigarette consumption had been increasing. However, during World War II, there was a very marked dip in consumption, due to lack of tobacco; then, consumption has been increasing during the first few years after World War II, but from then on it has allegedly been decreasing, especially if viewed in terms of "tar"/nicotine contents. Even making the most generous allowances for lag time, these two sets of data can not be reconciled. In my judgment, this is one of many examples that show that the allegations of a causal association between smoking and lung cancer cannot be reconciled with the facts.

Colby then asks Dembach to get Verband data on consumption, and cancer data from the Government.

* 18 March 1980, Dembach letter to Edwin Jacob, RJR 502742741.

Advises that a Verband publication, "Tobacco Booklet" is ready, to be distributed to employees only, that he succeeded "95%" in promoting a "less risky version. If however, extremely delicate things are hidden in the booklet, please tell this to Sam (Witt) and Frank (Colby) who will then decide together with me what to do."

* 27 March 1980, Pelz meeting notes to Dembach, "VdC scientific Committee (TFA) Meeting, Hamburg March 26, 1980." RJR 501545782 - 5784.

Smoke’s effect on hamster cells seems to increase DNA synthesis in lung cells, decrease DNA repair in spleen. Professor Obe finds higher chromosomal aberrations in peripheral white blood cells (lymphocytes) in smoking alcoholics compared to non-smoking alcoholics. A minipig study (ETS?) is approved, also an umbilical cord study. Pesticides were discussed.

Nitrosamine paper by Hoffman - Ruhl. Following a pertinent VdC Board decision, Dr. Adlkofer one way or another managed to have Dr. Hoffman [with Ernst Wynder’s American Health Foundation] withdraw his publication on nitrosamines in the smoke of German cigarettes. He is now said to publish in the ‘Lebensmittelchemie’Journal , which will have a much larger readership than Beitrage, but obviously is not edited by tobacco industry.

* 10 April 1980, Colby letter to H.C. Roemer (in-house counsel), RJR 512384899 - 4900.

Colby reports on the progress of various German researches: the "annoyance" study, the chemical threshold of cancer causing agents study. Colby wishes to discuss continued funding on the latter to a Dr. Henschler,

...one of the foremost German and International scientists, especially in the area of toxicology. Dr. Henschler has been extremely helpful in the past...in aiding us to best achieve our two objectives of funding impeccable smoking and health related research by open-minded scientists and to assist our German company and RJRTI in Europe in general, to assume in other countries a similar industry leadership role as in the United States.

Colby discusses a Prof. Oeser, University of Berlin, who says that while overall cancer incidence in Germany has remained stable, lung cancer may be an exception; "he alleges that smoking is probably one of the principal causes of lung cancer. The purpose of my visit [to him] will be to try to sway him -- or at least induce him to give this matter a great deal of further thought."

* 23 May 1980, meeting notes, Walter Fink (Philip Morris/Neuchatel Fabriques Tabak Reunies) to Tom Osdene (PM/USA principal scientist), "VdC Scientific Committee Meeting" (SCM), PM 2028524733 - 4736.

Influence of cigarette smoke on the DNA metabolism. It is Dr. Adlkofer’s opinion that the results of Dr. Altman’s study [in translation: Influence of cigarette smoke on DNA repair mechanism and on the chromosomes in spermatogenesis and red cell manufacture in hamsters] should be checked (reports sent only to T. Osdene.).... [Adlkofer has invited Dr. Preussman of the German Cancer Institute to speak on nitrosamines]: It is Phillip Morris’ opinion that there was no necessity to invite Prof. Preussman who’s [sic] attitudes concerning tobacco smoke and nitrosamines are well known. The VdC’s invitation is also in contradiction to the industry’s policy to avoid all public activities in the nitrosamine field at the moment.

* 6 June 1980, Pelz meeting notes report to Dembach, "Scientific meeting of the VdC (TFA), June 2, 1980." RJR 500926108 - 6109.

With representatives of the German Federal Health Office in attendance, reports were given by two invited researchers on nitrosamines - one indicating that it was a cancer risk factor in smoking (perhaps in combination with diet) and suggesting that cigarettes should have polycyclic aromatics, phenols and amines removed. The second scientist noted that "tobacco smoke is the biggest source of exogenous nitrosamines...the most versatile chemical carcinogens."

After the presentations, Dr. Fink of Philip Morris abstained from the discussion and Pelz withdrew.

The entire spectacle had been arranged in an attempt to show to the guests that Industry was concerned, that it was the Verband who could save Industry and to maneuver industry into an at least moral bind to do something.... The presentation was staged even though the VdC Board had recently rejected an article on nitrosamines [Hoffman’s] in the smoke of German cigarettes submitted for publication in Beitrage.

On ETS, the White/Froeb study of passive smoking in offices will be contested by various professors including Ernst Wynder.

# 2-13 June 1980, unsigned trip report by a British American Tobacco official, BAT (File no. B302 in Minnesota Depository) 105321117 - 1131.

Adlkofer attempting to create concept of a "safer" cigarette, citing Gio Gori’s approach at the National Cancer Institute.

He saw the need of the Industry as one of buying time, while independent scientists found ways to be publicists, in a P.R. sense, for "low risk" cigarettes.... Although Wynder accepted the Gori approach (and even used it on occasions), he still gave anti-smoking lectures, in order to maintain his credibility among medical authorities. It seems that Adlkofer gets a mixed reception from some of his member companies with US bases for his contacts with [Ernst] Wynder, who has acted as a consultant to the Verband.... Adlkofer added that Germany Government officials no longer trust the extreme anti-smokers and believe in the low risk approach. Politicians, on the other hand, are indecisive about whom to trust.

Report goes on to discuss nicotine as the driving force of "compensation" of low-tar cigarettes. Also discusses "tumorigenicity" [read, "carcinogenicity"] of nicotine:

I told him on a strictly confidential basis that we had strong indications from an incomplete mouse-skin experiment that tumorigenicity appeared to increase with increase in nicotine content. Adlkofer said that they Verband had made similar observations in a mouse-skin experiment by Brune.... Peter Lee has the interim results and Adlkofer gave me permission to obtain these from Lee. They showed that after 50-60 weeks, there was an increase in tumours in the group receiving the highest level of nicotine.... Adlkofer is obviously very concerned by this finding and, as a result, wishes to instigate a number of investigations of the effects of nicotine at the cellular level.

* 12 June 1980, Colby trip report to Timothy M. Finnegan (law partner in Jacob, Medinger and Finnegan), P.M. Schuler, Dembach (counsels), and Marcotullio, "Visits to German Research Grantees, Potential Grantees, and Related Contacts." RJR 500949802 - 9804, RJR 504821197 - 1200, RJR 500949809 - 9810.

Colby reports on ongoing projects mentioned in earlier reports. The previous three months required review time for all project approvals is now given as six months. Adlkofer asks Colby to comment on a letter Adlkofer drafted to the New England Journal of Medicine, criticizing the Froeb/White ETS study; Colby suggest a letter "by one or more German academic scientists" would be better. Colby notes that Prof. Jacob of Heidelberg gave the keynote address at the Anti-Smoking World Health Day -- and Jacob believes smoking causes lung cancer -- he had sent the draft of the speech to RJR-Germany, and that changes were made! "He was very unpleasantly surprised by the biased and one-sided interpretation of his remarks" by the media.

# 16 June 1980, meeting notes, Fink to Osdene, VdC SCM, PM 1000135116 - 5118.

"Beitrage zur Tabakforschung International" [the industry’s tobacco research journal]. The question was up for discussion whether the "Beitrage" should reject manuscripts which are in contradiction to the industry’s interests. Dr. Adlkofer stated that the "Beitrage" had to accept all manuscripts as far as they cannot be rejected for scientific reasons. The member companies delegates did not agree.... The general opinion was that each individual company should have the possibility to vote against a publication which is detrimental to the company’s interests.

* 16 July 1980, meeting notes VdC TFA, Pelz to Dembach, RJR 502740377 - 0379.

Adlkofer admonished never to bring outside guests in again (see meeting notes of 6 June 1980); the "vivid discussion" resulted in the deletion of material from the minutes of the previous meeting. Discussion about presence of pesticides in tobacco and cigarettes (maleic hydrazide).

# 12 August 1980, meeting notes, Fink to Osdene, VdC SCM, PM 1000122138 - 2141.

See note 11 March 1980. PM does not want Neurath’s figures on harmane/norharmane published because they are high.

* 2 September 1980, meeting notes VdC TFA, Pelz to Dembach, RJR 500880453 - 0456.

Document difficult to read, but continued discussions on various components of tobacco, including PAH (poly-aromatic hydrocarbons, a class of carcinogenic compounds) and nicotine as a cause of tumors on mouse skin painted with condensate.

Dr. Adlkofer said he knew of experiments that were done elsewhere in Europe that would support allegations against nicotine, but declared himself not to be in a position to reveal here.

# 19 September 1980, meeting notes, Fink to Osdene, PM 2028524723 - 4725.

PM and RJR rejected Neurath’s proposal to publish his harmane/norharmane data in "Beitrage" while Reemstma, BAT, Brinkmann, Austria Tabak approved. Industry statistician P.N. Lee finds that nicotine is a co-carcinogen (see note 30 October 1980) in the statistical analysis of the data. [N.B. The studies of Grimmer and Brune are mouse-skin painting experiments.]. Fink remarks, "In my opinion the German association is wasting money by projects like this.... [T]he results obtained very often turn out to be more detrimental than beneficial to the industries’ interest."

* 26 September 1980, Colby report to S.B.Witt, "Smoking and Health Research Projects in Germany." RJR 504821184 - 1191.

Colby describes "special projects," ones which are contracted and handled by the Verband but have been kept confidential from the old Research Council and the new Research Council. [N.B. Probably means the TFA, Tobacco Research Committee.]

The Verband has total control over the design of the experiments, the right of the researchers to publish.... These projects likewise need to be kept confidential to the outside (including CTR) excepting those having a ‘need to know’ within RJR, Philip Morris, Jacob & Medinger, and Shook/Hardy. These are the projects where we try...to achieve some consensus between Philip Morris and us.... Incidentally, I may have opened a somewhat better line of communication with PM on such projects, by talking directly to Dr. Tom Osdene (Alan Rodgman’s equivalent at PM) and/or Alex Holtzman.

The "special" and "confidential" projects included the following: 1. Co-carcinogenesis of nicotine (Colby deems the study poor and not publishable even though "a slight increase in carcinogenesis has allegedly been observed," with the statistical significance validated by Peter N. Lee "at best very limited"); 2. Determination of nitrosamines in sidestream smoke, reproducing earlier findings (Colby dismisses the results); 3. Presence of other mutagens in sidestream smoke (Adlkofer wants this study published, Colby and Pelz and PM opposed); 4. Compensation by smokers who switch to low tar-low nicotine cigarettes to achieve previous levels of intake (Colby is "adamantly opposed to this project on general principles" although Adlkofer, contrary to his earlier view, now wants to prove compensation exists). Ten other studies are mentioned, nearly all considered "worthless" or without "usable data" or "minor effects" or "questionable techniques" or "non-publishable" or "meaningless." The only study Colby finds worthy is one showing that smokers make more sperm than non-smokers.

Colby spends many words criticizing the planned compensation study by Dr. Schievelbein. "The full study and the preliminary study are ‘watergated’ with reference to purpose and grantor.... The study is represented to be dealing with fat metabolism and its alleged effect on cardiovascular parameters." [N.B. Colby used the term "watergated" to mean the industry concealing data.]

* 26 September 1980, Colby memo to Max H. Crohn (RJR in-house counsel), "Re: Public Smoking." RJR 503262709.

I have been informed on a confidential basis that there is a reasonable expectation for me to receive a paper by Dr. WYNDER, condemning the scientific validity of the White and Froeb study.... In all probability I will have the discretion to pass on this document to the Tobacco Institute for use as they may see fit, prior to the California Referendum. Confidential reliable information has been obtained that the chief expert of the German Government in the area of public smoking, a very well known Professor of the Free University of Berlin, also has written a paper, similarly condemning the scientific validity of the White and Froeb study, in response to inquiries from the German Parliament.... I am urging the German Industry Association to use their influence to have this inquiry and response expedited so that it would be used prior to the California Referendum.

[N.B. The paper by James R. White and Herman F. Froeb appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine in the spring of 1980, demonstrating that nonsmokers working in smoky offices had abnormalities of lung function similar to those seen in moderate smokers. White had been a major supporter of California Proposition 5 in 1978, which failed, and the upcoming Proposition 10, which subsequently also failed on the November 4 ballot. These propositions meant to restrict smoking in public places, restaurants and workplaces. The industry mounted fierce opposition through its front organization, Californians against Regulatory Excess (CARE). Letters of criticism of the paper written to the New England Journal of Medicine were similarly orchestrated, with authors like Gary Huber, Allan Freedman, Domingo Aviado whose paid links to the industry were not disclosed. Franz Adlkofer also had his letter published, though Colby had tried to discourage him -- see 12 June 1980 -- on the grounds that letters from persons not affiliated with the industry had already been submitted. See also Stanton Glantz, et al. The Cigarette Papers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 428-30.]

* 29 September 1980, Colby memo to S.B.Witt, "Tobacco Industry Sponsored Smoking and Health Research in Switzerland." RJR 503246621.

Comments on the "political" conditions in Switzerland, different from those in Germany, with respect to industry funding, so that researchers are quite independent. Nonetheless, Colby recommends the same basic structure as in Germany of funding and approval by tobacco companies through their Swiss Association.

* 6 October 1980, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, "Meeting with Dr. Herbert Bentley of Imperial Tobacco Ltd. Bristol/England -- September 9, 1980." RJR 500882657 - 2660

Bentley, once head of Imperial’s R&D, is identified as the "No. 2 man at Imperial,." second to Andy Reed. Colby discusses with Bentley "the basic political attitude of the British Industry management vis-a-vis their Government," and Bentley agrees, echoing Reed, that a firmer stance was needed. Colby notes,

The Industry has decided to stand firm against the Government’s demands on extreme control and/or reduction in advertising. The Industry believes that the Health Minister’s Sir George Young’s, extremist anti-tobacco industry stance will "in a crunch" not be backed by Margaret Thatcher who, according to "inside information", is for the Industry.

Colby urged the British industry not accede to or cooperate with the Hunter Committee demand that the Industry research "safer" cigarettes, and he pointed to the way the Verband had proceeded with its own Research Council [N.B. Colby refers to a 26 September memo to Witt on this, which has not yet turned up.] . Colby then passes on various bits of gossip, how Geoff Folton of BAT had been sidelined because he sided with S.J. Greene, head of BAT R&D who turned against the industry; Folton had called Colby a member of the "flat earth society." And Colby says of long-time Industry statistical consultant Peter N. Lee, "Peter was not only largely in agreement with the anti-smoking views of the British medical Establishment, such as Sir Richard Doll, but in addition to that, was from a technical point of view, not a very competent statistician." The Verband had recently hired Lee as their consultant.

* 10 October 1980, Colby report, "Compensation study." RJR 502741831 - 1832.

Colby complains about proposed Verband study seeking to determine if smokers switching to low tar/low nicotine cigarettes compensate to inhale the amount of nicotine they’ve been accustomed to. "I am adamantly opposed to this project... It is symptomatic that several years back the Verband was adamantly bent on proving that there was no compensation.... "

* 30 October 1980, Pelz meeting notes, "Scientific Committee Meeting of the VdC (TFA), October 30, 1980." RJR 501545704 - 5706.

Among other items, a discussion of whether BAT would do experiments on nitrous oxides in exhaled smoke at the Southampton. Committee felt CORESTA should not establish standards for determination of carbon monoxide and nitrous oxide, "and steps should be taken at Manila to prevent publication of methods."

Discussions on nitrates in exhaled smoke, nicotine as a co-carcinogen in mice, PAH, , and doubt cast on the NCI study begun in 1958 showing more lung cancer in smokers than non-smokers ("because of the similar smoking pattern of the control group [i.e. no lung cancer] evidence against a causal relationship...").

* 3 November 1980, meeting notes VdC TFA, Pelz to Dembach, RJR 500880306.

Discussion of the relationship between VdC and TFA. Adlkofer to stay as chairman of the TFA.

* 12 November 1980, Colby letter to B. Pelz, "Re: Minutes of the TFA meeting on October 8, 1980 - specifically ‘Inhalation - exhalation of NO/NO2." RJR 502740249.

Colby objects to any research on nitrates, possible carcinogen precursors in tobacco. "There is an abundant literature on NO -- and NO2 -- if any – in cigarette smoke.... In my judgment, this is just another example where the Verband artificially creates a problem where no problem exists."

* November 1980, meeting notes with a Dr. Biseld, Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit (a company determining the safety of atomic reactors), Pelz to Dembach,. RJR 502741939.

Biseld informs Pelz that tobacco plants take up from the soil and concentrate naturally occurring strontium 90 twenty to forty times the natural background. Biseld and Pelz seem to make common cause here.

This is an issue to them because tobacco is grown near the planned reactor at Rhyl and there is some danger that environmentalists pick this up and take it to court as they did with the enrichment of radioactive material by grapes. (The grape issue could be settled because the materials in question are removed during the yeast fermentation of grapes.) Dr. Biseld now wanted to know whether materials like Strontium would transfer from the tobacco into the smoke.... Dr. Biseld took the opportunity to ask me whether I could talk to the VdC on behalf of him. I promised to do so on December 4, 1980 (TFA meeting). Aside from this I think it would be a good idea to check our library whether we could provide him with any useful information concerning the transfer of heavy metals and certain radioactive isotopes, e.g. of Strontium, Cesium, Polonium, Plutonium.

# 20 November 1980, meeting notes, Fink to Osdene, VdC SCM, PM 2028524720 - 4722.

Now a study by Prof. Mohr indicates nicotine not a co-carcinogen (see note 19 September 1980). "Another DM 2000,000 wasted," writes Fink.

# 4 December 1980, meeting notes VdC TFA, Pelz to Dembach, RJR 502664410 - 4413.

In fact, the subject of Strontium 90 is not brought up until 8 April 1981. Professor Grimmer’s request for a grant to study PAH is revived, "because of a strong interest of the Verband to cooperate with Grimmer," but there would be a task force to determine the scope of the research needed "to reliably get an answer to the question of how nitrogenous compounds (proteins etc.) And nicotine would contribute to the formation of N-PAH." A study on the dangers of smoking while driving by Prof. Muller-Limroth (of the Arbeitsphysiologisches Institut) was discussed and new research on the matter proposed by the VdC; Muller-Limroth is consultant to the four million member German automobile club. Pelz remarks that "My feeling is that whatever the outcome of this research it will not weaken Prof. Muller-Limroth’s previously published warnings...."

A Coresta/TCRC Tabakkolloquim is planned and financed by VdC and Quester. Two guest speakers (Schievelbein and Baettig) will discuss "the importance of nicotine in cigarettes and its consequence for cigarette design, and the effect of nicotine on the human brain." Finally, a matrix of criteria for approval of proposed research is presented. The criteria are: Goal likely to be reached, scientifically sound, information under control, scientist sound, rating of importance, side benefits. [N.B. "Information under control" seems to have been the theme of the meeting.]

* 18 December 1980, Colby trip report, "Trip to Germany, Switzerland and Great Britain on Smoking and Health, December 1980." RJR 500949787 - 9791.

He sits in on the Verband TFA meeting as an "auditor," and criticizes the way Adlkofer runs the meeting. "It is, in my judgment, necessary to try find a way to remedy this." He also objects again to the compensation study.

In my judgment, however, it is imperative that the Verband receives unequivocal directives from the Executive Committee (composed of Mr. Fischer, Mr. von Specht (BAT-Germany), and other chief executives of the participating companies), not to make any commitment -- financially or otherwise -- on the full study, until ALL the results of the preliminary study can be assessed by the company scientists, for a minimum of about two months.... [Colby meets with a Dr. Harke, who had done studies on public smoking when with the Verband Research Institute, but who was treated] ...rather shabbily when the Institute was dissolved. Since Dr. Harke is a potential witness on public smoking, I have made a -- I believe -- successful effort to cultivate his friendship, by inviting him to lunch or dinner about once a year.

# 1981, no author, hand-written translation of Verband report on coumarin, RJR 511018368 - 8370.

Absolves coumarin:

If we disregard the erroneous reports on the carcinogenic activity of coumarin, then we can say, that coumarin does not cause any carcinogenic malformations, even with very high doses.... The permissible amount of coumarin use[d] (i/2000) lies below the absolute "no effect level[."]

.

# 5 January 1981, meeting notes, Fink to Osdene, VdC SCM, PM 2028524717 - 4719.

Further insight into Grimmer’s proposal to study N-PAH. He threatens to go to other institutions for support if VdC turns it down. He wants to correlate findings with lung cancer.

It is the VdC’s feeling that in order to control Grimmer and to prevent him from publishing results eventually obtained in the study and being detrimental to the industry’s interest we have to support the project.

* 15 January 1981, meeting notes VdC TFA, Pelz to Dembach, RJR 502664311 - 4312.

Discussions on how to go about researching PAH and N-PAH, a study on nitrosamines and diet (a Dr. Altmann finds smokers excrete less nitrosamines in the urine). Drs. Brune and Grimmer instill condensate into hamster throats [N.B. Recall the Dontenwill experiments that produced cancers, and perhaps led to his departure from the VdC laboratory], "This piece of research of the old Forschungsrat did not produce any useful results." On mouse skin painting experiment by Brune [see 19 September 1980],

Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons were shown to have no effect. The committee agreed that the VdC should not press for a publication of results because this might stimulate the researchers to search for other culprits.

# 12 February 1981, Report by Philip Morris scientist R.B. Seligman, "Surgeon General’s Report - Response." PM 2000515457 - 5462.

Discussing Industry responses to anti-smoking attacks,

Attempts in individual countries, e.g., CTR, TAC [UK], and the Verband unfortunately have tended to res