1. 7 December 1977, minutes, S.J. Green, "Notes on meeting with Sir Robert Hunter," BAT

   (File no. M479) 110072137 - 139.

   Sir Robert chaired the Hunter Committee which advised the UK Secretary of State on tobacco issues. Here he advised the industry to reduce tar, quickly, to a 10 mg level. The response from the UK firms was muted, "desultory," in Green's term.

2. 2 May 1980, paper by T.G. Mitchell (Gallahers), "The addition of nicotine to tobacco products," BAT (File no. M488) 110088143 - 155.

   A "how-to" compendium. From chemical synthesis to growing of high-nicotine tobacco strains (N. Tabacum and N. rustica) to tobacco plant cell culture (Japanese Monopoly and Gallahers had experimented) to waste tobacco recycling to use of tobacco extracts. Various means of addition to cigarettes are discussed. Mitchell reminded the readr that nicotine is both a poison and a possible co-carcinogen through conversion in smoke to nitrosamines.

   Notable quote: "...[A]ddition of nicotine solutions to sheet was tried at Le Mans and required evacuation of the plant." "The simplest route of nicotine fortification of blends immediately available is from the selection of high nicotine tobaccos."

3. 29 March 1976, analysis and appended commentary on same, unsigned (S.J. Green stamp on top), "The product in the early 1980s," BAT (File no. M491) 110069974 - 987.

   The analyst believes the greatest threat to the smoking habit is its social marginalisation, as it becomes increasingly a lower class habit. The trend to lower delivery products is a danger as it may wean smokers away from cigarettes. If marijuana is legalised, it might be added to cigarettes at "near sub-liminal levels." The commentator says there is no reason for cigarettes to last forever, that it smoking is associated with disease, directly or indirectly causal.

   Notable quote: Commentator -- "Certainly -- on the evidence -- governments would be failing in their duty if they did not act. Scientific proof is not necessary to mae action desirable." "I believe most smokers would think the Industry dishonest it it claims there is no health problem." "Smoking is fairly irrational like other drug-dependencies. If there is a positive side to smoking, and I think there is, it is not easy for the smoker to articulate. He 'votes with his feet' and continues with this irrational act." "Before we do work aimed to sell low delivery cigarettes...we should do some work to establish that in fact they are safer."

4. 16 December 1975, memo from S.J. Green to A.M. S. Elliot, "International 'defence' of smoking," BAT (File no. M497) 110073584.

   Opposes setting up an international pro-smoking lobby, it would stir up the anti-smoking forces. A low-profile cooperative approach is desired.

   Notable quote: "We have learnt that we have no basis for trusting Philip Morris in this connection. Their behaviour in different countries depends more on market share than on any desire or view on the long term interests of our industry, and it can be quite irresponsible." [NB. Could this be the prelude to Green's disaffection with BAT some five years later?]

5. Circa March 1982, discussion paper, unsigned (possibly C.H. Stewart Lockhart), "What should the Group do about the credibility of the industry through INFOTAB and/or National Manufacturers Associations and elsewhere?" BAT (File no. M92) 109877135 - 160.

   How to handle the "credibility" issue. INFOTAB succeeded ICOSI as the industry information and public relations organization. This document has a severe attack on WHO which is trying to enlist other UN agencies in the anti-tobacco fight. The industry's allies are the leaf growers, dealers, politicians and officials.

   Notable quote: "We must therefore think carefully not just about developing our credibility in the emergent nations, but also about protecting ourselves at the international level and actively seeking to get policies at this international level."

6. 30 April 1982, analysis, R.L.O. Ely, "Obstacles/enemies of a swing to low tar," BAT (File no. M92) 109877141 - 145.

   Among the obstacles is "quitting."

   Notable quote: "It is possible that there are smokers who may take the reduction in tar to the ultimate limit. That is to say, to quit smoking. If this is so quitting is a very serious obstacle to the marketing of low tar brands since we would be destroying our own market. On the other hand, it seems more likely that, if people are reducing their tar intake because of concerns for health, low tar brands are helping to maintain the market."

7. Circa 1981 (refers to impending Garfinkel report that will contradict Hirayama), meeting of BAT cooperating companies' Chairman's Advisory Committee, unsigned, "Smoking issues,"

   BAT (File no. M92) 109877148 - 160.

   The CAC gathers to decide on joint tactics in response to such topics as restrictive tar levels, passive smoking, attacks on the industry, employee education, third party discussions, education of children in schools.

   Notable quotes: "Companies must monitor government activities in schools. Some governments aim to eliminate smoking from the total population. There is evidence of some propaganda being counter-productive but this may not be so if the propaganda starts at the earliest possible age. It may be difficult to discover the effects for some years. Companies should study government propaganda films and, if necessary, take court action to prevent screening." [Emphasis added.]

   "It is not possible to negotiate with WHO but discreet personal contacts are possible. Discussions with press and with scientists and the medical profession is better carried out by the NMA [National Manufacturers' Association], if possbile, as there can be dangers to individual companies."

8. 23 April 1981, notes, J.J.J. Mostyn (BAT Millbank) to L.C.F. Blackman (Executive Director BAT research), "World-wide political and social aspects of smoking issues," BAT (File no. M92) 109877230 - 237.

   WHO is singled out in particular for its increased coordination world-wide, the 1979 "Controlling the Smoking Epidemic" report, the World Health Day of 1980, coordination with UN agencies and NGOs. To counter, industry uses INFOTAB and inter-company collaboration, and setting up of new National Manufacturers' Associations ("Venezuela, Chile, etc.")

   Notable quotes: "P.A. Department Millbank – PM New York link, BAT/PM in Latin America. Aruba meeting November 1980. Joint BAT/PM visits in 1981 to Argentina and Chile."

BOX 18 (no File numbers in this box -- many are duplicates from BOX 1, among others)

1. 22 July 1992, proposal and correspondence, BATCOMN 000251 - 253.

   A Dr. Stephen Gentleman of St. Mary's Hospital Medical School, London, asks for BAT funding to study the effect of nicotine on Alzheimer's disease. He gets a cool reception from Dr. E.D. Massey.

2. 4 January 1993, letter from R. Davies to Dr. H. Al Mu'men, Ministry of Health, Kuwait, BATCOMN 000664 - 669.

   This is a fuller version of item 16, BOX 1, batcodoc1. The reasons why tar levels should not be reduced by the Gulf Coordinating Council from 12 to 10 are given here. They include the prospect of smuggling and smokers turning to other products like hookahs, pipe smoking.

   Notable quotes: "As you are aware smokers 'compensate' when only low tar cigarettes are available. This point is made in the booklet 'Islam's Ruling on Smoking" issued by the WHO Alexandria office in 1988." [NB. Even the Devil can cite scripture.]

3. 6 February 1990, memo from H.F.D. Dymond to A.L. Heard, "2 mg minimum," BATCOMN 000862-863.

   See BOX 2 item 17 batcodoc4. Dymond reviews the negotiations to get all companies to agree to a 2 mg tar minimum to avoid the "tar derby" fiasco of BAT being sued by Philip Morris in Switzerland over BARCLAY's claim to 1 mg as measured by machine – but equivalent to 5 mg when compensated by smokers.

   Notable quote: "Anti-smoking bodies, Government Health Departments and other regulators already question the value of low tar products and the subject of compensation is now quite well understood by such people. Active promotion of 1 mg products is likely to further increase their attention on the compensatory issue."

4. 6 December 1989, report by P.C. O'Keeffe (of IBM) to R.A. Crichton (BAT), "International brand strategy of offensive use of low sidestream paper," BATCOMN 000978 - 982, 001002, 001004.

   With new paper BAT can reduce visible sidestream smoke.