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the Minnesota Tobacco Industry Document Depository

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Annotations of documents gleaned from the British American Tobacco Company (BATCO) and BAT Industries documents at the Minnesota Tobacco Industry Document Depository. There are twenty-six boxes, (18 from BATCO, and 8 from BAT Industries (mainly financial statements, which should be of interest to those tracking industry structure). The material in Minnesota represent about ten percent of a larger cache in Guildford, England, also now open to the public. The box numbers here refer only to this Minnesota Select Set but the Bates numbers should be equivalent.

BATCO BOXES
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |

BATI BOXES
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |

BOX 2

  1. 12 October 1953, report on research strategy, "RFR," "Scientific research, experimentation and tobacco testing," BAT (File no.A1811) 100114185 - 187.

    Urges BAT to establish a research capacity, links it smoking and health, lung cancer in particular.

    Notable quote: "If the worst happened [lung cancer proved a result of smoking] – and the suggestion is finally established as a fact – then, either an antidote will be found for it or we must expect smoking to diminish, and perhaps rapidly."

  2. 11 May 1971, minutes, "Meeting of the Committee of Directors," BAT (File no. A267) 10049418 - 419.

    Research should continue on non-tobacco alternatives.

    Notable quotes: "...with a view to the production of materials which, prima facie, could be supposed to offer a health advantage to the smoker..." "The Board of BAT restates its view that if cigarette smokers were to carry over their inhalation habits to cigar smoking they might be exposing themselves to the same risks as are alleged to apply to cigarette smoking...."

  3. 29 June 1964, letter, W.W. Reid (W.D. and H.O. Wills, Australia) to H.D. Anderson, Esq. (BAT), BAT (File no. A270) 100050229.

    Suggests simply synthesizing nicotine, and be done with tobacco as its source.

  4. 28 January 1960, letter, "Tom" M.W. (Brown and Williamson) to H.D. Anderson (BAT), BAT (File no. A370) 100093995 -996.

    Comments on a proposal from a Wisconsin lumber salesman suggesting that Wisconsin cheese could be used as cigarette filter material.

    Notable quotes:[citing a press release:] "'Cheese tastes being what they are, the used filters would be greatly in demand among gourmets, particularly as to canapes at cocktail parties.'"

    "The samples which were sent to me previously stained the paper and became rancid very shortly.... the odor was terrific." [NB. No wonder Minnesotans call Wisconsinites "cheeseheads."]

  5. 8 July 1964, memo H.D. Anderson to R.P. Dobson, "Potassium carbonate," BAT (File no. A408) 100059066 - 067.

    Potassium carbonate is an alkalinizing agent.

    Notable quotes: "There seems no doubt that the 'kick' of a cigarette is due to the concentration of nicotine in the blood-stream which it achieves and this is a product of the quantity of nicotine in the smoke and the speed of transfer of that nicotine from the smoke to the blood-stream. Nicotine is in the smoke in two forms as free nicotine base (think of ammonia) and as a nicotine salt (think of ammonium chloride).

  6. 26 July 1965, memo from F. Haslam (R&D Southampton) to D.G. Felton), "Ammonia treatment of tobacco," BAT (File no. A413) 100066860).

    Passes on suggestion that "ammonia treatment" could be used to modify the smoke of "cheap, and at present unacceptable, leaf so as to make it an agreeable constituent of certain European tobacco blends."

  7. 9 July 1965, extract of report, unsigned, "Ammonia treatment of tobacco," BAT (File no. A413) 100066862.

    Cites S.J. Green, Haslam, Hughes on positive aspects of ammonia treatment.

    Notable quote: "Dr. Green said that this process might well be of interest as it did two things. It increased the nicotine release from a given tobacco by 30%. And it produced a new type of tobacco which was different from any tobacco at present available."

  8. 30 January 1957, memo, D.G. Felton, "A possible alternative hypothesis," BAT (File no.

    A 453) 100175773.

    Cites Paul Kotin's idea that smog can cause lung cancer. This memo is interesting because it uses the code word "ZEPHYR" to stand for lung cancer.

    Notable quote: "It occurs to me that this theory might be the basis of an Alternative Hypothesis, which might explain the seeming causal relationship between ZEPHYR and cigarette smoking statistics."

  9. 22 May 1975, memo, D.E. Conway to S.J. Green, "Forecasting the effect of anti-smoking events," BAT (File no. A9) 100027602 - 604.

    Acknowledges that health propaganda, rises in price and advertising bans all reduce smoking rates (though recovery occurs over several years).

  10. 9 June 1975, letter, F.J.C. Roe to Walter Dontenwill (Director of the Verband research laboratory), BAT (File no. A 957) 100285184- 185.

    Acknowledges Dontenwill's positive findings of tumors in hamster larynx and tries to explain why it wasn't found in Roe's studies of rats.

  11. 10 November 1990, strategic plan, "A.L.H.," "Tobacco strategy review team meeting,"

    BAT (File no. AA 0179) 401048152 - 157.

    Forward look: chemosensory research to reduce irritation, improve sensation; improve cigarette design for flow rates and pressure drops; modify ingredients "that reduce the subsequent formation of minor compounds of interest to Regulators"; cigarette substitutes; new bioassays; ETS research; sidestream smoke reduction.

  12. 14 December 1987, minutes, Sharon Boyse, "Note on a meeting with the Independent Scientific Committee" (A British government body), BAT (File no. AA0190) 401059177 -178.

    ISC interested in cigarette substitutes, mainly nicotine-delivery devices.

    Notable quote: "The Committee adopt a pragmatic approach to the question of smoking and, believing that outright banning of the product is unlikely to be achievable in the forseeable future, they concentrate on 'improving' the existing product."

  13. 28 February 1990, proposal, R.R. Baker, "Chemosensory research," BAT (File no. AA 0315) 401020175 - 181.

    Chemosensory research to improve the low tar cigarettes - aerosol research, mouth sensory research, saliva research, decreased irritability.

    Notable quote: "The ultimate product of the tobacco industry is nicotine and research should continue to be directed at the development of low tar/medium nicotine cigarette smoke."

  14. 26 July 1972, report, S.J. Green, "The association of smoking and disease," BAT (File no. AA 0328) 401024232 - 236.

    Acknowledges that the link between smoking and disease must be acknowledged, and that industry must work on finding a safer cigarette.

    Notable quotes: "Because smoking has become a social problem, cigarette manufacturers must become more, rather than less, socially responsive." "The association of cigarette smoking and some diseases is factual." "Tobacco smoking habit is reinforced or dependent upon the psycho-pharmacological effects mainly of nicotine."

  15. 11 January 1989, minutes, A.L.H., "Notes on BARCLAY strategy meeting," BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112645 - 647.

    Acknowledgment that the supposed 1 mg tar cigarette was smoked in such a way as to be equivalent to 5 mg. In exchange for agreeing not to label Barcaly as 1 mg where not required (eg. Switzerland), Philip Morris and RJR would drop law suit in Switzerland.

  16. 15 September 1989, minutes, unsigned, "CORESTA smoke study group," BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112655 - 662.

    An industry-supported European research body where rival firms can come to meet and agree on policies. Here how BAT will label BARCLAY's tar content, and how other companies will do so in what will be reported out as the "Harmonisation Report."

    Notable quotes: "As part of the earlier BARCLAY discussions with P.M. it was agreed that they would support a statement in the new methods proposing a minimum reported tar level of 2mg. This was included in the draft. Two problems occurred. 1. P.M. in Japan were arguing for a lower limit of 0.5mg tar and 0.05 mg nicotine. This was causing great concern not only for b&W but for the rest of the Industry.... Initially, P.M. wanted to leave the matter to local discussion but we insisted that P.M. stick to the agreement worldwide. It also transpired that their concern was for nicotine and to be able to advertise NEXT as less than 0.1mg nicotine.... Subsequently P.M. Japan agreed to pursue negotiations in Japan in line with the rest of the Industry. 2... R.J.R. U.S.A. had a problem with the 2mg . They had been called before a Congressional hearing to justify the claim for NOW and were concerned that a positive [industry] statement that cigarettes must not be labeled with tar values below 2mg would prove detrimental to their case. If we proceeded R.J.R. would have to object officially. They made it clear that scientifically they supported the statement and that the objection was entirely a legal concern. An objection by R.J.R. may have been a catalyst for other companies to follow and there would have been a risk of dissention [sic] resulting in the standards failing to be adopted. A compromise was agreed."

    The agreement was to discuss 2mg in terms of the minimum level that can be measured with reliability and giving wide range of tolerance in the measurements, as agreed in an industry ISO meeting in Havana, Cuba in November 1989: "Where values are reported below 2mg, in conformity with prevailing laws and regulations, the data shall be produced or confirmed by one laboratory recognised by the regulatory authority. Otherwise, values obtained below 2 mg, using this method should be reported as 2 mg."

  17. 16 December 1988, minutes, H.F.Dymond, "Notes of a meeting held with J B Boder of Philip Morris," BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112693 - 698.

    Elaborate negotiations with Philip Morris to call off their law suit against BATUKE in Switzerland for the claim that Barclay's had only 1mg tar when the ACTRON filter design caused compensation by the smoker and the cigarette smoked like a 5mg brand, making the machine reading a deception. An agreement on industry standards ahead of the CORESTA/ISO meetings was needed for the good of Industry.

    Notable quotes: "In general, the management of PM have a low opinion of BAT and believe that BAT will use any opportunity to renege on its previous positions and cannot be trusted.... At this point HFD told Boder that BAT felt exactly about PM as apparently PM felt about BAT"

    pages 401112699 - 708 show the various companies (RJR, PM, Reemstma, Gallahers, Italian Monopoly B&W, BATUKE) meeting in Geneva to iron out industry wide technical aspects of ventilated filters, how they are tested and how smoked.

  18. 18 May 1988, draft report, R.E. Thornton, H.F. Dymond, "Issues relating to Barclay," BAT (file no. AA0832) 401112734 -736

    An explanation that markets were contracting in developed countries, competition keen to bring innovative products on, demand for lower delivery cigarettes increasing. Need for BAT to be stronger in CORESTA, and establish stronger relationships with national monopolies whose vote at CORESTA counts. Suggests allying with RJR "in defence of innovative products."

    Notable quote: "In this scenario manufacturers may develop very competitive strategies to attack successful innovations, especially if it is perceived that they have an 'unfair' advantage."

  19. 9 June 1988, memo from A.L. Heard to BAT CEO Bramley, "ISO TC 126 meeting, Beijing, 27-29 April 1988," BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112738 - 744.

    BAT took a beating at the meeting, PM had delegates lined up against the BARCLAY product.

    Notable quotes: "There is no reason why any other company should support BAT on the channel-ventilated cigarette issue – we have all the patents and thus the only products.... Unless our competitors can be licensed to use the Actron filter or some similar commercial initiative is taken, we can expect no support from anyone."

  20. ? mid-1988, hand-written note, unsigned, BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112747.

    Difficult to read in places, but a chronologic list of ideas of the attempts of PM and BAT to use ISO industry standards for tar and tar measurement to their own advantage.

    Notable quotes: "all cigs compensate.... PM & others should be informed (at senior level) that unless attacks on Barclay cease, we will take action to inform consumers that m/c figs do not provide accurate guide to uptake from all vent. prods. 'Armageddon' Mar '88 decided not to do so – await China ISO."

  21. 25 October 1990, memo from H.F. Dymond to D.G. Harwood (BATCO, Millbank), "Lower tar limit," BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112899 - 900.

    Now it is RJR's turn to protest any attempt to set a minimum tar reading above 1mg because of products in the USA and Japan. The 2mg compromise agreement seems gone, even as BAT agreed to reposition Barclay as a 5mg cigarette. Memo suggests that BAT member companies could develop 1 mg products, i.e. that would not undercut BAT"s own Barclay.

    Notable quote: "With increasing pressure on pack printed values the most important issue is to ensure sufficient tolerances." [NB. a table showing repeatability and reproducibility of machine testing to be wide enough to permit a 2mg minimum to be declared even for lower tar cigarettes.]

  22. September 1993, Training workshop overheads, "Records Management Programme," BAT (File no. AC0872) 402156730 - 797 (a few pages extracted).

    Workshop on how NOT to write memos and records that could be discovered in litigation, whether from plaintiff smokers or from other companies. One classic is presented, the marketing ideas for Viceroy, 3 March 1976, where appeal to the young smoker to include relating "the cigarette to pot, wine, beer, sex, etc."

    ? mid 1980s, R.A. Crellin, "Ammoniated reconstituted tobaccos," BAT (File no. AM 0221) 403356078 - 083.

    Reviews ammonia technology of PM, RJR and BATCO's own. The technique produced a low-irritation taste.

    Notable quote: "All major U.S. manufacturers are now using ammonia technology in one form or another."

  23. 4 March 1993, memo from D. Irwin (R&D), "Assorted notes on ROOT meeting...(or a counterblast to ammonia?)," BAT (File no. AF0208) 401850152 - 155.

    Questions the premises behind various technologies to enhance taste and pH, as compared to selection and blending of the right kinds of tobacco. Doesn't believe taste panels are objectively carried out.

    Notable quote: "Would disclosure of urea as a tobacco additive have a negative effect on consumer perception given that it is a constituent of urine?"

  24. Undated, focus group research results, "Saturn," BAT (File no. AF0208) 400229127 - 148.

    Besides various likes and dislikes about cigarettes, study traces the life history and personal and social attributes of a smoker: beginning with ages 9-12, the "experimental phase"; 14-16, the "adoption phase"; then the "habituated adult."

  25. 1 March 1991, memo to all BAT companies from A.L. Heard (BAT R&D), BAT (File no. AQ0584) 400182372.

    Notable quote: "The Tobacco Strategy Review Team has identified a need to add greater confidentiality to our use of ammonia technology throughout the BAT Group. They have asked that for commercial confidentiality, we substitute a code word in place of the expression 'ammonia technology'. Each individual process, e.g. ammonia inclusion in bandcast or paper type sheets, ammonia treatment of stems or lamina and incorporation of ammonia compounds in extrusion processes, will continue to carry their existing code-names. By separate letter I shall inform you of this new code name which has been established by B&W. I would ask you to ensure that this name is communicated to all your staff and is used in any relevant documents and verbal presentations."

   

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