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Barclay Cigarettes: Batco's Attempt To Pull The Tar Over Everyone's Eyes.
From The Minnesota Cache Of Batco Documents.
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“Presentation by CEO Barry Bramley to BAT Industries' international tobacco conference, Budapest - May 1992,” titled, “The World Cigarette Market and BAT,” BAT 700324698 - 753.
(A corporate report, comparing BAT, and BAT's brands, to other companies, noting the opportunities for growth in former Soviet Union and Far East. Significant growth of low price market segment in USA, Malaysia, and Australia.)
Notable quotes: “Wherever it is agriculturally feasible, BAT encourages the development of tobacco growing by independent farmers by providing seed, fertilisers, and technical farming advice. BAT provides advice and assistance to over 500,000 small farmers from whom it purchases tobacco every year.” [hand crossed-out]: “BAT's agricultural expertise is frequently used to advantage in joint development projects with governments and other agencies.” “Within this competitive industry the issue of taste and flavour is paramount if we are to gain a lead over our competitors - particularly in the low and ultra low delivery sectors of the market. BAT has been at the forefront in researching new processes and products and as an example I will mention two. The Actron Filter has been the reason for the success of Barclay with its novel filter ventilation concept, [hand crossed-out:] which has a beneficial effect on the sensory properties of the smoke.” “The attacks from the industry's opponents now focus on making smoking socially unacceptable, the removal of the industry's right to market its products and making cigarettes unaffordable by consumers as a result of excessive taxation. It is vital that smokers remain free to use our products and every effort must be made to ensure that this happens. We must also fight to protect the company's right to market its products by promoting freedom of choice and freedom of commercial speech.... Recently we have had successes in [hand crossed-out:] persuading governments to change changing excise systems and we have been instrumental in securing a postponement until the end of the decade of the abolition of inter-EEC duty free. Industry as a whole is now under the microscope of environmentally conscious individuals,, organisations and ultimately, Governments.... the zealous manner in which green goals are pursued is definitely cause for concern.”
- Research report, NO. RD. 2077, P.C. Bevan, 14 May 1987, “A review of the factors influencing nicotine/tar ratio in mainstream smoke,” BAT (File no. AQ2910) 400493381 - 398.
(Blend and ventilation increase the ratio. High blend nicotine (including Y1), high ventilation, and also alkaline pH can give a ratio three times that of a “full flavour” product, e.g. Barclay's.)
Notable quote: “Technologically, design of a high NTR product anywhere in the 1-10 mg tar range is possible immediately. Subjectively, it is not clear how NTR should vary with tar delivery to give 'acceptable' smoking characteristics at any given delivery level.”
- Market analysis, no author, April 1982, “Conference on marketing low delivery products,”
BAT (File no. G928) 102213836 - 849.
(Why Barclay succeeded.. An “ultra-low” brand offering a male-model “warm” image; a good-taste theme of “the pleasure is back” probably reflecting quick nicotine delivery to the throat; the Actron filter, expanded tobacco, strong all-lamina blend, promising just 1 mg tar or “99% tar-free”; “buy-one-get-one-free” launch. Philip Morris and RJR sued, alleging the construction fooled the FTC smoking machine -- a triumph of compensation by blockage of ventilation holes.)
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Minutes of marketing meeting, M.J. Hardwick (research and development), 2 May 1985, “Barclay Plus,” BAT (File no. G999) 102943790 - 796.
(Discussion of different legal smoke testing standards in different countries, need to increase tar in the Barclay stemming from the litigation by competitors, discussion of designing a cigarette with five mg tar when ventilation holes blocked or 1-3 when unblocked.)
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January 1989, minutes, A.L.H., “Notes on BARCLAY strategy meeting,” BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112645 - 647.
Acknowledgment that the supposed 1 mg tar cigarette was smoked in such a way as to be equivalent to 5 mg. In exchange for agreeing not to label Barclay as 1 mg where not required (eg. Switzerland), Philip Morris and RJR would drop law suit in Switzerland.
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15 September 1989, minutes, unsigned, “CORESTA smoke study group,” BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112655 - 662.
An industry-supported European research body where rival firms can come to meet and agree on policies. Here how BAT will label BARCLAY’s tar content, and how other companies will do so in what will be reported out as the “Harmonisation Report.”
Notable quotes: “As part of the earlier BARCLAY discussions with P.M. it was agreed that they would support a statement in the new methods proposing a minimum reported tar level of 2mg. This was included in the draft. Two problems occurred. 1. P.M. in Japan were arguing for a lower limit of 0.5mg tar and 0.05 mg nicotine. This was causing great concern not only for b&W but for the rest of the Industry.... Initially, P.M. wanted to leave the matter to local discussion but we insisted that P.M. stick to the agreement worldwide. It also transpired that their concern was for nicotine and to be able to advertise NEXT as less than 0.1mg nicotine.... Subsequently P.M. Japan agreed to pursue negotiations in Japan in line with the rest of the Industry. 2... R.J.R. U.S.A. had a problem with the 2mg . They had been called before a Congressional hearing to justify the claim for NOW and were concerned that a positive [industry] statement that cigarettes must not be labeled with tar values below 2mg would prove detrimental to their case. If we proceeded R.J.R. would have to object officially. They made it clear that scientifically they supported the statement and that the objection was entirely a legal concern. An objection by R.J.R. may have been a catalyst for other companies to follow and there would have been a risk of dissention [sic] resulting in the standards failing to be adopted. A compromise was agreed.”
The agreement was to discuss 2mg in terms of the minimum level that can be measured with reliability and giving wide range of tolerance in the measurements, as agreed in an industry ISO meeting in Havana, Cuba in November 1989: “Where values are reported below 2mg, in conformity with prevailing laws and regulations, the data shall be produced or confirmed by one laboratory recognised by the regulatory authority. Otherwise, values obtained below 2 mg, using this method should be reported as 2 mg.”
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16 December 1988, minutes, H.F.Dymond, “Notes of a meeting held with J B Boder of Philip Morris,” BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112693 - 698.
Elaborate negotiations with Philip Morris to call off their law suit against BATUKE in Switzerland for the claim that Barclay’s had only 1mg tar when the ACTRON filter design caused compensation by the smoker and the cigarette smoked like a 5mg brand, making the machine reading a deception. An agreement on industry standards ahead of the CORESTA/ISO meetings was needed for the good of Industry.
Notable quotes: “In general, the management of PM have a low opinion of BAT and believe that BAT will use any opportunity to renege on its previous positions and cannot be trusted.... At this point HFD told Boder that BAT felt exactly about PM as apparently PM felt about BAT”
pages 401112699 - 708 show the various companies (RJR, PM, Reemstma, Gallahers, Italian Monopoly B&W, BATUKE) meeting in Geneva to iron out industry wide technical aspects of ventilated filters, how they are tested and how smoked.
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18 May 1988, draft report, R.E. Thornton, H.F. Dymond, “Issues relating to Barclay,” BAT (file no. AA0832) 401112734 -736
An explanation that markets were contracting in developed countries, competition keen to bring innovative products on, demand for lower delivery cigarettes increasing. Need for BAT to be stronger in CORESTA, and establish stronger relationships with national monopolies whose vote at CORESTA counts. Suggests allying with RJR “in defence of innovative products.”
Notable quote: “In this scenario manufacturers may develop very competitive strategies to attack successful innovations, especially if it is perceived that they have an ‘unfair’ advantage.”
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9 June 1988, memo from A.L. Heard to BAT CEO Bramley, “ISO TC 126 meeting, Beijing, 27-29 April 1988,” BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112738 - 744.
BAT took a beating at the meeting, PM had delegates lined up against the BARCLAY product.
Notable quotes: “There is no reason why any other company should support BAT on the channel-ventilated cigarette issue - we have all the patents and thus the only products.... Unless our competitors can be licensed to use the Actron filter or some similar commercial initiative is taken, we can expect no support from anyone.”
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? mid-1988, hand-written note, unsigned, BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112747.
Difficult to read in places, but a chronologic list of ideas of the attempts of PM and BAT to use ISO industry standards for tar and tar measurement to their own advantage.
Notable quotes: “all cigs compensate.... PM & others should be informed (at senior level) that unless attacks on Barclay cease, we will take action to inform consumers that m/c figs do not provide accurate guide to uptake from all vent. prods. ‘Armageddon’ Mar ‘88 decided not to do so - await China ISO.”
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25 October 1990, memo from H.F. Dymond to D.G. Harwood (BATCO, Millbank), “Lower tar limit,” BAT (File no. AA0832) 401112899 - 900.
Now it is RJR’s turn to protest any attempt to set a minimum tar reading above 1mg because of products in the USA and Japan. The 2mg compromise agreement seems gone, even as BAT agreed to reposition Barclay as a 5mg cigarette. Memo suggests that BAT member companies could develop 1 mg products, i.e. that would not undercut BAT”s own Barclay.
Notable quote: “With increasing pressure on pack printed values the most important issue is to ensure sufficient tolerances.” [NB. a table showing repeatability and reproducibility of machine testing to be wide enough to permit a 2mg minimum to be declared even for lower tar cigarettes.]
- 10 June 1982, position paper, unsigned, “BAT position on various allegations that could be raised at the AGM,” BAT (File no. C98) 100443246 - 262.
Eighteen items are listed in the index: advertising in third world, warning labels dual standards, dumping of high tar cigarettes on third word nations, international brands dual standards, WHO recommendations, UNCTAD report, UICC guidelines, re-afforestation, aldrin, “Spur” article on deforestation in Kenya, animal experiments, sponsorship, Times article 24th March by Annabelle Ferriman, passive/public smoking, Argentina (expropriation during Falklands War), lobbying and entertainment of MPs, smoking and pregnancy, Barclay (B&W statement).
Notable quotes: Advertising - “BAT duly complies with the laws and regulations of every country in which it operates.... It is the policy of all our companies world-wide that their advertising for tobacco products be directed at adults and for achieving brand preference only.”
Warning clauses - “We believe this is properly the responsibility of governments....”
Dumping - “...[W]e provide consumers with a full range of brands of varying deliveries. It must be appreciated that it is the consumer who makes the final choice and if, as in many countries, he smokes only 2 or 3 cigarettes a day, it is understandable that he prefers a more flavourful cigarette.” [NB. The brands offered by export or made at the time of this paper ranged from 15 to 20 mg tar.]
WHO recommendations (in “Controlling the Smoking Epidemic,” 1979) - “ ‘Recommendation Non-smoking should be regarded as normal social behavior.’ The recommendation totally fails to recognise that smoking is a long established habit followed by very many people.... [I]t has not scientifically been proven that smoking causes diseases in humans.... ‘Recommendation There should be a total prohibition of all forms of tobacco promotion.’ ...[P]romotional techniques are intended to achieve brand preference and reinforce brand loyalty.... [N]or does it appear that such advertising causes people to begin smoking.... ‘Recommendation exports should be discouraged and the Industry progressively reduced in size.’ Implementing this recommendation could have serious social and economic consequences, particularly on those developing countries with few alternate forms of industry.” [NB. Etc., etc.]
Lobbying and entertaining MPs - “It would be an insult to suggest that anybody could be bought for the price of a lunch. BAT, in common with many other companies and interests, retain two MPs as Parliamentary advisers. They help to keep the company in touch with developments in the House of Commons and in the party political process.”
[NB. Pages on pregnancy and Barclay are not present in this file.]
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4 January 1993, letter from R. Davies to Dr. H. Al Mu’men, Ministry of Health, Kuwait, BATCOMN 000664 - 669.
This is a fuller version of item 16, BOX 1, batcodoc1. The reasons why tar levels should not be reduced by the Gulf Coordinating Council from 12 to 10 are given here. They include the prospect of smuggling and smokers turning to other products like hookahs, pipe smoking.
Notable quotes: “As you are aware smokers ‘compensate’ when only low tar cigarettes are available. This point is made in the booklet ‘Islam’s Ruling on Smoking” issued by the WHO Alexandria office in 1988.” [NB. Even the Devil can cite scripture.]
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6 February 1990, memo from H.F.D. Dymond to A.L. Heard, “2 mg minimum,” BATCOMN 000862-863.
See BOX 2 item 17 batcodoc4. Dymond reviews the negotiations to get all companies to agree to a 2 mg tar minimum to avoid the “tar derby” fiasco of BAT being sued by Philip Morris in Switzerland over BARCLAY’s claim to 1 mg as measured by machine - but equivalent to 5 mg when compensated by smokers.
Notable quote: “Anti-smoking bodies, Government Health Departments and other regulators already question the value of low tar products and the subject of compensation is now quite well understood by such people. Active promotion of 1 mg products is likely to further increase their attention on the compensatory issue.”
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9 September 1983, letter from Patrick Sheehy to George Weissman (Philip Morris, New York), BAT 201080394 - 395.
The fight between PM and BAT over BAT”s claim in Europe that Barclay cigarettes had 1 mg tar by machine testing, when the ACTRON grooved ventilation filter supported compensation to considerably higher levels..
Notable quotes: “Philip Morris Holland B.V. recently took out full-page newspaper ads in violation of Dutch law to republish an anti-smoking group’s slander of Barclay. Upon demand, your company offered to cease this advertising but declined to publish a retraction, leaving us no recourse except through the courts. The current campaign of the Dutch Anti-smoking groujp expressly deplores the growth of Light cigarette sales in that country and seeks ways of reversing the trend. They have singled out Barclay merely because it is the latest success. The overall thrust is against all cigarette brands including those of your good company. I find it incomprehensible that Philip Morris would weigh so heavily the short-term commercial advantage from deprecating a competitor’s brand while weighing so lightly the long-term adverse impact from an on-going anti-smoking programme. I believe this is the first time a Tobacco Manufacturer has purchased space to promulgate the anti-smoking position. In doing so, Philip Morris not only makes a mockery of Industry co-operation on smoking and health issues, but also appears to inaugurate a free-for-all in which illegal conduct is condoned provided the commercial stakes are high enough.”
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Circa 1980s, strategic essay by C.C. Greig, "Structured creativity group...marketing > scenario," BAT (J83) 100515899 - 910.
"Blue sky" vision of the future for the industry. Greig ultimately argues for a return to the cigarette of old, a high tar/high taste cigarette, using the concept of "elasticity" whereby the smoker can easily draw to a high value, the Barclay being a prototype.
Notable quotes: "A cigarette as a 'drug' administration system for public use has very very significant advantages: i) Speed Within 10 seconds of starting to smoke, nicotine is available in the brain....Other 'drugs' such as marijuana, amphetamines, and alcohol are slower and may be mood dependent. ii) Low dosage The delivery of nicotine from the puff of a UK middle tar (US full flavour) is about 0.1mg or 100ug of the active agent.... [Compared to alcohol, aspirin] nicotine is about the lowest dose 'common' drug available. Cost The unit cost of a 10 minute 'high' from tobacco is , in UK terms, about 6 pence.... This sum is about 40 seconds pre tax earnings at the UK average wage or about 1 minute after tax! The Future? Thus we have an emerging picture of a fast, highly pharmacologically effective and cheap 'drug', tobacco.... However, it has drawbacks. The major one is that it has a 'health shadow' over it which is not easy to dispel. Secondly, it is a messy habit, polluting the non-smokers breathable atmosphere, and leaving ash and debris, not to mention smells, around for hours or days. Thirdly, carelessly used, it sets fire to things." "It is a moot point whether actual deliveries to humans have ever really dropped across the vast majority of the smoking population.... [T]he immediate conclusion is that puff volumes have risen as inexorably as machine deliveries have declined.... Many people will tell you authoritatively that, on a sound statistical analysis of well designed experiments, low tar smokers do not compensate. Rubbish.... People will want the 'highest' delivery for a unit price...it is more liable to be a 'medium' delivery compensatable product."
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