Philip Morris presented to the UK industry their global strategy on environmental tobacco smoke.  In every major international area (USA, Europe, Australia, Far East, South America, Central America & Spain) they are proposing, in key countries, to set up a team of scientists organized by one national coordinating scientist and American lawyers, to review scientific literature or carry out work on ETS to keep the controversy alive. [NB.  “Keep the controversy alive” is industry jargon for casting doubt on any evidence indicating that passive smoking -- environmental tobacco smoke or ETS in industry jargon --  is in any way harmful.] They are spending vast sums of money.... A list of potential scientists who could be contacted in the UK was produced.  Because of the heavy financial burden, Philip Morris are inviting other companies to join them in these activities.... The Philip Morris philosophy of ETS was presented. This appeared to revolve around the selection, in all possible countries, of a group of scientists either to critically review the scientific literature on ETS to maintain controversy, or to carry out research on ETS....   The mechanism by which they identify their consultants is as follows: - they ask a couple of scientists in each country (Francis Roe and George Leslie in the UK) to produce a list of potential consultants. The scientists are then contacted by these coordinators or by the lawyers and asked if they are interested in problems of Indoor Air Quality: tobacco is not mentioned at this stage. CVs are obtained and obvious ‘anti-smokers’ or those with ‘unsuitable backgrounds’ are filtered out. The remaining scientists are sent a literature pack containing approximately 10 hours reading matter and including ‘anti-ETS’ articles. They are asked for a genuine opinion as independent consultants, and if they indicate an interest in proceeding further a Philip Morris scientist makes contact.  Philip Morris then expect the group of scientists to operate within the confines of decisions taken by PM scientists to determine the general direction of research, which apparently would then be ‘filtered’ by lawyers to eliminate areas of sensitivity. Their idea is that the groups of scientists should be able to produce research or stimulate controversy in such a way that public affairs people in the relevant countries would be able to make use of, or market, the information.  The scientists would not necessarily be expected to act as spokesmen for the industry, but could be if they were prepared to do so.7

Remes and Gaisch had already practiced their method the year before, and exactly in the area of ETS,  in West Germany and the Nordic region, using prominent scientists to recruit others, developing what was called a “personal relationship.”  (“We had already recruited Dr. George Neurath [who] has been to the United States for training...and should be of great help to us in identifying other candidates.”).8  The “training” at PM headquarters was intended to make the recruited scientists (called “whitecoats”) become “completely cognizant concerning the science of environmental tobacco smoke and prepared to share that knowledge with others at the industry’s request...in promoting an objective understanding of the issue among members of the scientific community, government officials and members of the public.”9

  Some of the Nordic scientists  “sought assurances that their work would be used for constructive purposes and not simply to block smoking restrictions or to disparage the work of their peers,” not realizing that Philip Morris and its law firm were calling the recruitment programs the “Witness Project.”10

Sharon Boyse had been careful in her memo to distance BAT from the Philip Morris approach: “The excessive involvement of external lawyers at this very basic scientific level is questionable...likely to frighten off a number of scientists who might otherwise be prepared to talk to the industry.”  Nonetheless, BAT has now followed the method exactly in recruiting Chinese medical scientists.  An advertisement in the South China Morning Post, 2 November 1996, placed by an international personnel search firm (Morgan and Banks), announced a “Unique commercial opportunity for a medical professional [in a] fast moving consumer goods industry...[for] conducting market research and performing collateral analysis with a view to meeting the company’s commercial and marketing objectives.” The source of the notice was revealed in a “strictly confidential ad search assignment specification [for a] scientific advisor” to be BAT. 11 The actual job description was to “place...emphasis on supporting the rights of an adult who chooses to smoke,” and for  “portraying the company view on smoking and health to key audiences in China.”  The scientist would speak about “information acquired locally....to other scientists, and interpret the information for lay persons,” as well as journalists and “regulators.”  Echoing the technique suggested by RJR’s Colby and made corporate policy by Philip Morris, the scientist would also develop “contacts within the Chinese academic community open to debate on smoking issues.”

“Open to debate” for the tobacco industry means one direction only: According to the BAT job advertisement, “data related to smoking and health [in China] is quite different to that acquired, for example [,] in the United States,” blatantly ignoring the gathering evidence that “cigarette smoking is already a major cause of death in China,” principally from lung cancer, coronary heart disease, and chronic obstructive lung disease, just as elsewhere.12      

The USA Tobacco Institute adopted the name  “Witness Project” to recruit experts who would testify that cigarette advertising was simply to attract smokers to one brand or another while “a young person’s decision to smoke” was influenced by peers, parents and sibling; that women smoked because of the changes in gender roles to which advertising was merely reacting; and that industry sponsorship of athletic and cultural events was better than “dependence on public funding.”13  The Tobacco Institute memo describes the same familiar technique of recruiting potential witnesses and their vetting by an industry law firm (here, Covington & Burling).  The memo makes clear that the recruits are brought to an acceptable state: “The witnesses developed through this project could serve one or more functions.” [Emphasis added.] Only one or two would be entrusted to testify before Congress, while others would speak to journalists or prepare essays.

The industry’s alarm over passive smoking is manifested by the serious attention given to recruiting witnesses and consultant researchers to counteract the growing evidence of harm.  In 1989 lawyer John Rupp of Covington & Burling established the “Asia ETS Consultant Project.”  A 14 February 1990 memo reports extensively on the status of the project to Philip Morris and other “supporting companies” (RJR and BAT/ Brown and Williamson).14  Recruitment and orientation in the first year covered China, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Philippines and Korea.  Recruitment in Japan was underway in cooperation with the Japan Tobacco Industry.  Thirteen consultants are named: Drs.  Reverente, Roa, Ferrer and Somera in the Philippines; Drs. Liao and Bacon-Shone in Hong Kong; Drs. He and Liu from China; Drs. Kim and Roh in Korea; Dr. Rampal in Malaysia; Dr. Ong in Singapore; and Dr. Wongphanich in Thailand.  Dr. Wongphanich was important to recruit “because of her position as president of the Asian Association of Occupational Health; Dr. Reverente was a past president and Dr. He was due to succeed to the presidency  in 1991.

Among other activities of the Asia ETS Consultant Project, “approximately 80 of our consulting scientists from more than 20 countries participated in a major international ETS symposium that was hosted by McGill University in Montreal.”  The consultants -- among them Kim, Liao and Bacon-Shone -- agreed to distribute copies of the proceedings within their countries.  This is a prime example of industry “junk science” as the “symposium” was funded by the industry and McGill merely rented out some space for the meeting!15  To lend a further air of scientific legitimacy, an industry-funded organization created in the same year, Indoor Air International, planned a monthly journal to begin in 1991 in which a number of the Asian consultants could publish their articles, based in part on the “McGill” symposium.  Drs.  Bacon-Shone, Ferrer, He, Kim, Liao, Liu and Reverente were recruited to serve on the editorial board.

Bacon-Shone went on to present a paper at The Lisbon conference on “Indoor Air Quality and Ventilation in Warm Climates,” critiquing “the unsophisticated statistical analysis appearing in Dr. Hirayama’s paper on ETS and nonsmoker lung cancer in Japan, the cornerstone of the scientific literature relied upon by industry critics.”

Finally, in addition to country-specific activities, the report mentions a proposal  brought to the “supporting companies” to create an Asian Cities Monitoring Project, by which it was hoped to show that indoor air pollution was mainly due to outdoor pollutants, vehicle emissions principally.  Drs.  Liao, Bacon-Shone and Linda Koo agreed to consult on the project.  “Because the Hong Kong study will be conducted and reported by independent [sic!] scientists, we expect the results will carry (however inappropriately) more weight...than have the results of previous studies conducted and reported by industry scientists.”

Hedley Thomas and Jason Gagliardi have recently published on the Internet a follow up to the Asia ETS Consultants Project.16  In it they cite Dr. John Bacon-Shone  (“one of a handful of key advisors to the highest levels of the Hong Kong Government”) as denying any knowledge that it was tobacco industry money that sponsored his attendance at ETS symposiums in Montreal, Lisbon and Thailand in 1990; he also vigorously denied John Rupp’s assertion that of course Bacon-Shone knew.  “My position is clear,” Bacon-Shone is quoted as saying, “the evidence that tobacco is a health hazard is overwhelming, but the work by Professor Hirayama and others overstated the risk of ETS.”  “ETS is a health hazard,” he said, but mainly “obnoxious.”

The Kansas City law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, long serving to the tobacco industry, also reported in 1990 on its ETS witness program.17  Under a “three-company authorization” the law firm contacted over 35 consultants to see who would write a critical response to the US EPA report on second-hand smoke, yielding over 20 written statements.  Many of the witnesses were already known to the law firm.  Twenty-five names are supplied; details are given as to their work experience, their views on ETS if known, and comments made on their suitability.  (Because it is not clear which of these persons actually became industry witnesses or what kind of statements were provided on the EPA document, their names will not be given here; readers may consult the original document.)

 “Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.”  Let the reader or listener beware, and insist on knowing who is paying for the witnesses’ time and message.